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RICO HAD A BIRTHDAY! A FIFTY-YEAR
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RANDY D. GORDON*
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) came into
the world in 1970, a time of great social upheaval that was accompanied by
shifting attitudes towards both crime and civil litigation. From the outset, the
statute’s complexity, ambiguity, and uncertain purpose have confounded courts
and commentators. At least some doubts as to the statute’s meaning and
application arise because it has criminal and civil components that subject it
to the twin—yet antithetical—social impulses to be “tough on crime” while
containing a perceived “litigation explosion.” In this Article, I situate RICO
in this larger context and offer that context as a partial explanation of how
RICO’s “meaning” has been shaped. Along the way, I synthesize many years
of my own legal scholarship and litigation experience into a retrospective of
where RICO interpretation and application have been—and where they still
must go.
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 132
II. BIRTH OF RICO AND ITS CULTURAL CONTEXT....................................... 133
A. A Brief History of Crime Legislation and Enforcement .............. 133
B. A Brief History of Organized Crime Legislation ......................... 135
C. The Path to RICO ......................................................................... 135
D. RICO’s Purpose(s) as Revealed in its Legislative History .......... 136
E. The Litigation Explosion .............................................................. 138
III. GETTING TOUGH ON CRIME: EXPANDING THE RICO CONCEPT OF
“ENTERPRISE” .................................................................................... 141
IV. CONTAINING THE EXPLOSION: CIVIL RICO IN THE COURTS ................. 142

* Ph.D. Edinburgh (Law); Ph.D. Kansas (English). Executive Professor, School of Law and
Department of History, and Faculty Fellow, School of Innovation, Texas A&M University; Office
Managing Partner (Dallas), Duane Morris, LLP. I wish to thank Griffin Tolle and Reese Griffin, my
research assistants, and students at Texas A&M School of Law, for their considerable contribution to
the arguments and authorities cited below. The views expressed in this Article are mine alone and do
not necessarily represent those of Texas A&M, Duane Morris, or my clients.

GORDON_26NOV21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

132

11/30/21 2:42 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:131

A. What is Included in § 1961(4)—the Definition of “Enterprise?” 145
B. Pattern of Racketeering ................................................................ 150
C. Special Standing Problems in Private Litigation .......................... 151
i. Proof of Injury......................................................................... 151
ii. § 1962(a) and (b) Problems ................................................... 155
iii. General Standard for Proof of Causation by Holmes ........... 157
a. Proof of Causation: Anza.................................................. 158
b. Proof of Causation: Bridge .............................................. 160
c. Proof of Causation: Hemi ................................................. 161
D. Does RICO Have Borders? .......................................................... 163
E. RICO’s Remedies ......................................................................... 165
i. Equitable Relief ...................................................................... 165
ii. Other Relief and Remedies .................................................... 169
F. A RICO Miscellany ...................................................................... 170
i. Limitations .............................................................................. 170
ii. The PSLRA Exemption and Other Limitations ..................... 173
V. CONCLUSION............................................................................................ 177
I. INTRODUCTION
RICO has reached a half-century milestone. Passed as Title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA), the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) has proven to be something of an
interpretive parlor game for lawyers over its fifty-year history. The problems
with the statute are at least three. Structurally, it’s complicated: to state a civil
RICO claim a plaintiff must show that he was injured “by reason of” a criminal
RICO violation, which entails pleading such a violation, which in turn requires
him to identify the predicate commission of certain specified crimes (e.g., mail
or wire fraud) and to satisfy certain defined terms (e.g., pleading the existence
of an “enterprise”).1 It’s also vague in the linguistic and philosophical sense of
having borderline cases (e.g., what’s “tall” or a “mountain?”) and ambiguous
to boot (e.g., the convoluted syntax and word choices support more than one
reading).2 Finally, and perhaps most problematically, it’s of uncertain purpose.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1), 1962, 1964(c).
2. As members of Congress complained at the time of its consideration, RICO “embodies poor
draftsmanship,” a complaint echoed in many court decisions, which almost universally paint the
problem as one for Congressional solution. H.R. REP. NO. 91–1549, at 185 (1970) (dissenting views
of Representatives John Conyers, Jr., Abner Mikva, and William F. Ryan); see, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Nw.
Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) (“RICO may be a poorly drafted statute; but rewriting it is a
job for Congress, if it is so inclined, and not for this Court.”).
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I’ve written extensively about RICO for many years and litigated civil
RICO cases for even longer, so this Article is intended mostly as a “state of the
statute”—with a focus on civil RICO—based in part on past research,
commentary, and experience.3 I will nonetheless make a normative claim here
and there with respect to questions that remain open.
II. BIRTH OF RICO AND ITS CULTURAL CONTEXT
There’s a tension in American law between its civil and criminal regimes.
This tension—which is perhaps best described as a sociological phenomenon—
emerges most clearly in public and political debates over “tough on crime”
legislation and enforcement, on the one hand, and a perceived civil “litigation
explosion,” on the other. So, statutes like RICO and the antitrust and securities
laws, which provide for both government and private enforcement, are born
subject to antithetical forces.4 To understand the push and pull within RICO
litigation, therefore, one needs an understanding of the forces acting on the
courts.
A. A Brief History of Crime Legislation and Enforcement
The 1960s and 1970s were times of great social upheaval. Many
commentators trace a trend towards greater crime control to the 1968
presidential race and Richard Nixon’s promise to restore social order. But, as
Walker Newell suggests, Nixon had at his disposal Barry Goldwater’s wellknown “Southern Strategy,” in which he played on links between race and
crime:
3. Randy D. Gordon, Of Gangs and Gaggles: Can a Corporation Be Part of an Association-inFact RICO Enterprise? Linguistic, Historical, and Rhetorical Perspectives, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973
(2014) [hereinafter Gordon, Of Gangs and Gaggles]; Randy D. Gordon, Clarity and Confusion:
RICO’s Recent Trips to the United States Supreme Court, 85 TUL. L. REV. 677 (2011) [hereinafter
Gordon, Clarity and Confusion]; Randy D. Gordon, Crimes That Count Twice: A Reexamination of
RICO’s Nexus Requirements Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1964(c), 32 VT. L. REV. 171 (2007)
[hereinafter Gordon, Crimes that Count Twice]; Randy D. Gordon, Rethinking Civil RICO: The Vexing
Problem of Causation in Fraud-Based Claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 319 (2005)
[hereinafter Gordon, Rethinking]; Randy D. Gordon, Making Meaning: Towards a Narrative Theory
of Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Justification, 12 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 1 (2017) [hereinafter
Gordon, Making Meaning]. Where appropriate, issues analyzed in these prior works have been updated
to reflect the current state of the law.
4. “Born” is perhaps a bit of a misnomer in that RICO is the only of the three to have been
promulgated with a private right of action. Private plaintiffs had to await passage of the Clayton Act
to have standing to bring Sherman Act claims; a private right to sue under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act was not implied until the Supreme Court’s decision in Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971).
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Our wives, all women, feel unsafe on our streets. And in
encouragement of even more abuse of the law, we have the
appalling spectacle of [Adlai Stevenson] actually telling an
audience that “in the great struggle to advance human civil
rights, even a jail sentence is no longer a dishonor but a proud
achievement.” Perhaps we are destined to see in this lawloving land people running for office not on their stainless
records but on their prison record.5
Nixon took a subtler and wider tack, arguing that a slide into cultural
decadence had set in:
Certainly racial animosities . . . were the most visible causes.
But riots were also the most virulent symptoms to date of
another, and in some ways graver, national disorder—the
decline in respect for public authority and the rule of law in
America. Far from being a great society, ours is becoming a
lawless society.6
As we’ll soon see, Nixon’s fear of a “lawless society” extended quite
specifically to organized crime.
The political turn in criminology became operationalized through state and
federal legislation that restructured the sentencing process and increased
sentence severity. As Sara Sun Beale puts it, “[t]he rehabilitative ideal, which
dominated postwar penal theory and practice in the United States, suffered a
‘wide and precipitous decline’ in the 1970s, attacked by both conservatives and
liberals.”7
In its place, an ideology of “crime prevention through
incapacitation” took root, which found expression “in legislation that rejected
the goal of rehabilitation and in indeterminate sentencing regimes intended to
tailor imprisonment to the individual offender’s need for rehabilitation” and to
keep offenders locked up for mandatory minimum periods.8

5. Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on Crime
Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 14–15 (2013).
6. Id. at 15.
7. Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 414 (2003) (quoting FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 4–6 (1981)).
8. Id.
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B. A Brief History of Organized Crime Legislation
There’s no doubt that the animating purpose of the RICO statute was to
combat organized crime as it existed in the post-WWII era. (Think: the Mafia.)
The road to RICO was quite long and begins with a series of press and crime
commission reports from the 1940s warning that major American cities were
being overrun by a national crime syndicate.9 In response, the Senate launched
an investigation to determine whether organized crime “utilizes the facilities of
interstate commerce or otherwise operates in interstate commerce in
furtherance of any transactions which are in violation of the law . . . and, if so,
the manner and extent to which, and the identity of the persons, firms, or
corporations by which such utilization is being made . . . .”10 The investigating
committee issued four reports, which confirmed that nationwide organized
crime syndicates did exist, but no legislation made it into the books.11
C. The Path to RICO
Against this deep background, the direct legislative history of RICO begins
in 1967 with the report popularly known as the Katzenbach Commission.12
According to (now) Judge Gerard Lynch:
[T]he report of the Katzenbach Commission is significant in
the legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, because so many of the provisions of the act find their
origins in recommendations of that body and, in particular, in
the analysis performed by its task force on organized crime.
Three aspects of the Commission’s response to organized
crime are particularly notable. First, despite occasional
recognition of the diffuse nature of “organized criminal
groups,” the Commission clearly conceived of organized crime
as a single entity and directed its primary attention toward a
single target: the Italian syndicate it believed controlled
organized crime throughout the United States. Second, the
9. The Center for Legislative Archives, Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National
Archives:
Chapter
18.
Records
of
Senate
Select
Committees,
1946–68,
http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-18-1946-1968.html
[https://perma.cc/Y67U-EP2K].
10. Investigation of Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce Before Special Committee to
Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, 81st Cong. 135 (1950) (statement of Sen. Estes
Kefauver, Chairman).
11. The Center for Legislative Archives, supra note 9.
12. Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
661, 666 (1987).

GORDON_26NOV21.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

136

11/30/21 2:42 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:131

Commission saw as a prime aspect of the threat posed by this
syndicate its increasing tendency to involve itself in legitimate
business and union activities. Finally, while the Commission’s
conception of the menace of organized crime is significant in
understanding the thinking of those who drafted the RICO
statute, the Commission itself did not recommend enactment
of anything resembling RICO.13
Congress immediately responded with a number of bills, including two that
are generally seen as RICO precursors and that targeted the infiltration of
legitimate business rather than the crimes typically associated with organized
crime.14 But none of the bills were enacted, and the matter was left for the next
Congress.
D. RICO’s Purpose(s) as Revealed in its Legislative History
In keeping with the tough-on-crime mantra of the day, “Congress decided
that organized crime posed such a grave threat to society that only new, more
stringent legislation could ameliorate the situation” especially given that—
under then-existing laws—“most organized crime participants went
unpunished.”15 The fundamental interpretive question that we must ask, then,
is how was RICO supposed to “ameliorate the situation?”
Many previous commentators (including me) and courts have closely
examined aspects of RICO’s legislative history, so there’s no need to do so
here.16 What we must do, though, is ask what social problem the OCCA was
intended to remedy and how RICO was to help in that effort. Returning to
tough-on-crime President Nixon, as he put it to Congress, “[O]rganized crime
has deeply penetrated broad segments of American life. In our great cities, it is
operating prosperous criminal cartels. In our suburban areas and smaller cities,

13. Id. at 672–73.
14. Id. at 674.
15. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899–900 (1st Cir. 1980), rev’d, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
16. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 510–19 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587–93 (1981); DAVID B. SMITH & TERRANCE
G. REED, CIVIL RICO ¶ 1.01 (2021); Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest:
Lessons from Civil RICO, 50 SMU L. REV. 33, 38–50 (1996); Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil
Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 807–14 (1990); G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249–80 (1982); G. Robert
Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts—
Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014–21 (1980); Lynch, supra note 12, at 666–80;
Gordon, Of Gangs and Gaggles, supra note 3, at 976.
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it is expanding its corrosive influence.”17 It does this through a “virtual
monopoly of illegal gambling, the numbers racket, and the importation of
narcotics,” the proceeds of which give it the power and resources to underwrite
criminal businesses like loansharking, to “infiltrate and corrupt organized
labor,” and to increase “its enormous holdings and influence in the world of
legitimate business.”18 The problem had been exacerbated because organized
crime groups, the most influential of which were the “24 [La] Cosa Nostra
families,” had been subject to prosecution efforts, “not a single one [was]
destroyed.” 19 Moreover, the leaders of these groups had “been notoriously
successful in ‘getting off’ even if those relatively few cases in which the
evidence ha[d] warranted the prosecution.” 20 The antidote to this was:
[A] bill which has been carefully drafted to cure a number of
debilitating defects in the evidence-gathering process in
organized crime investigations, to circumscribe defense abuse
of pretrial proceedings, to broaden Federal jurisdiction over
syndicated gambling and its corruption where interstate
commerce is affected, to attack and to mitigate the effects of
racketeer infiltration of legitimate organizations affecting
interstate commerce, and to make possible extended terms of
incarceration for the dangerous offenders who prey on our
society.21
In sum, the OCCA was aimed at (1) preventing Mafia kingpins from
tampering with or intimidating witnesses, (2) making it easier to prosecute
interstate gambling operations, and (3) preventing the infiltration or corruption
of legitimate organizations.22 Only the third of these goals was initially
assigned to RICO, which—as of January 21, 1970—was described thusly:
“[p]rohibits infiltration of legitimate organizations by racketeers or proceeds of
racketeering activities where interstate commerce is affected.”23 RICO
authorized civil remedies comparable to the antitrust field to prevent violation
of law by divestiture, dissolution, or reorganization.24 The House and Senate
Reports, as well as the Report of Senate Judiciary Committee and Executive

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 35 (1969) (quoting H.R. DOC. NO. 91-105, at 1–2 (1969)).
Id.
116 CONG. REC. 503, 585 (Jan. 21, 1970).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id.
S. REP. NO. 91-617 (1969) at 81.
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Branch commentators, are all to similar effect—i.e., RICO was aimed at
infiltration of legitimate organizations.25
Read in this light, RICO’s purpose is narrower than we have come to
assume. To be sure, its net captures more than the “Mafia” (although that was
certainly the impetus and primary target).26 So what is it that organized
criminals do? We know that they commit an array of acts that are otherwise
illegal, but they also infiltrate and otherwise corrupt legitimate businesses and
other organizations. To capture all these bad acts in a single statute risks
vagueness bordering on unconstitutionality, which some have argued is the case
with RICO.27 But others believe that the statute, when drafted, was targeted
and that statutory construction in service of expansive criminal reach is to
blame for the confusion that has ensued. In any event, RICO’s three substantive
provisions, § 1962(a, b, and c), map onto an important set of what organized
criminals “do”—namely, invest in, muscle in on, or operate enterprises through
a pattern of specified racketeering acts. Thus conceived, “enterprise” is the
feature that distinguishes RICO from other crimes, and one to which we will
return shortly.
E. The Litigation Explosion
By the 1980s, the notion that the United States was in the midst of a
litigation explosion was ubiquitous. Indeed, by the middle of the decade, the
Maryland Law Review devoted an issue to the question, with a lead article by
Mark Galanter, followed by a number of responses. Galanter was out to debunk
the explosion as a myth, but as he recounts, it was a myth with a good deal of
pop-culture and political currency (and one that persists even today).28 He
begins with a parade of horribles, led by Senator McConnell, speaking in the
run-up to the introduction of the Litigation Reform Act of 1986: “Hardly a day
25. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 38–39 (1970). The Executive Administrations all seemingly
responding about “a bill designed to prohibit the infiltration of legitimate organizations by racketeers.”
S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 76 (1970); Id. at 100, 121, 128 (Office of Deputy Attorney General); Id. at 126
(The General Counsel of the Treasury); Id. at 128 (Small Business Administration, Office of the
Administrator).
26. 116 CONG. REC. at 586 (Jan. 21, 1970).
27. See George Clemon Freeman, Jr. & Kyle E. McSlarrow, RICO and the Due Process “Void
for Vagueness” Test, 45 BUS. LAW. 1003, 1008–10 (1990); Michael S. Kelley, “Something Beyond”:
The Unconstitutional Vagueness of RICO’s Pattern Requirement, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 331, 380–94
(1991); Jed S. Rakoff, The Unconstitutionality of RICO, 203 N.Y. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1990); Terrance G.
Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 721–26 (1990); H.J. Inc. v. Nw.
Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 254–56 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 5 (1986).
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goes by that we do not hear or read of the dramatic increase in the number of
lawsuits filed, of the latest multimillion dollar verdict, or of another small
business, child care center, or municipal corporation that has had its insurance
cancelled out from under it.”29 This pain was inflicted on society because,
“quite simply, everyone is suing everyone, and most are getting big money.”30
The result is a “mad romance . . . with the civil litigation process.”31 In sum,
McConnell concluded, “we are all suffering a progressively debilitating
disease—the disease of hyperlexis, too much litigation.”32
Galanter goes on to demonstrate how the idea of a litigation explosion had
propagated across the media, industry, and even the government. This from
Washington Post columnist Jack Anderson: “Across the country, people are
suing one another with abandon; courts are clogged with litigation; lawyers are
burdening the populace with legal bills . . . . This massive, mushrooming
litigation has caused horrendous ruptures and dislocations at a flabbergasting
cost to the nation.”33 USA Today picked up on the cultural devolution theme:
Everybody in the USA suddenly seems to want to sue anybody
with liability insurance coverage. The explosion of litigation
has choked court dockets. And too-few lawyers tell potential
clients that some cases are a waste of time. . . . The greed has
turned the temple of justice, long a hallowed place, into a
pigsty. The time has come to clean it up.34
Self-interested industry participants eagerly chimed in: “America’s civil
liability system has gone berserk. . . . [It] is no longer fair. It’s no longer
efficient. And it’s no longer predictable.”35 One trade association took the
rhetoric to Biblical levels of alarm:
Like a plague of locusts, U.S. lawyers with their clients have
descended upon America and are suing the country out of
business. Literally. The number of product liability suits and
the size of jury awards are soaring. Filings of personal injury
cases in federal courts have jumped 600% in the past decade.
Product liability suits filed in federal courts doubled from 1978
to 1985.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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In 1974, the average product liability jury award was $345,000.
Last year it averaged more than $1 million . . . . Product
liability suits have brought a blood bath for U.S. businesses and
are distorting our traditional values. We’re now the most
litigious country on earth—one of every fifteen Americans
filed a private civil suit last year. The judicial system is so
clogged with cases, delays, continuances, appeals and legal
shenanigans that it’s slugging its way through a perpetual
traffic jam.36
And even the Attorney General’s Tort Policy Working Group joined the
chorus:
The growth in the number of product liability suits has been
astounding. For example, the number of product liability cases
filed in federal district courts has increased from 1,579 in 1974
to 13,554 in 1985, a 758% increase . . . . There is no reason to
believe that the state courts have not witnessed a similar
dramatic increase in the number of product liability claims.37
Again, Galanter’s aim was to show that the perception of mushrooming
litigation was a false one, but he adequately shows that by the 1980s, there was
a widespread fear that civil litigation had run amuck and must be reined in, as
indeed it was.38 Just for example, rulings in securities cases began to restrict
the category of plaintiffs entitled to sue39 and defendants liable to be sued;40
antitrust cases also raised standing barriers41 and made it more difficult to plead
and prove violations.42
Civil RICO, which had lain dormant for most of the 1970s,43 emerged as a
force in the midst of the just-recounted general backlash against private
litigation. As Douglas Abrams suggests, “[b]y late 1981, . . . plaintiffs began
36. Id.
37. Id. at 22.
38. In a response to Galanter, economic reporter Robert Samuelson located the problem, roughly
speaking, as a system that provides perverse incentives to lawyers. Robert J. Samuelson, The Litigation
Explosion: The Wrong Question, 46 MD. L. REV. 78, 78 (1986).
39. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731–32 (1975) (holding that a private
right of action under 10(b) is limited to purchasers and sellers).
40. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177
(1994) (holding that aiders and abettors cannot be sued by private parties under 10(b)).
41. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596–97 (1986) (engrafting
“plausibility” standard onto antitrust conspiracy allegations).
42. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977) (holding that indirect purchasers of
price-fixed product lack standing).
43. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985).
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to discover not only civil RICO’s existence, but also its potential as a general
federal antifraud remedy.”44 “The civil RICO litigation explosion” ensued,
fueled—at least in part—by an expansive interpretation of RICO’s “enterprise”
element, which is RICO’s distinguishing feature.45
III. GETTING TOUGH ON CRIME: EXPANDING THE RICO CONCEPT OF
“ENTERPRISE”
“Enterprise” is statutorily defined to include “any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”46 The first few words
don’t pose difficult interpretive dilemmas, but the “union or group of
individuals associated in fact” is unclear.47 The open question during RICO’s
first decade was whether this definition applies only to legitimate enterprises or
more broadly to criminal enterprises (like the Mafia or Hell’s Angels). A split
of authority emerged, and in a critical move, the Supreme Court resolved the
issue.
Thirteen individuals, including Novia Turkette, Jr., were charged with,
among other things, violating RICO § 1962(c) by operating an association-infact enterprise through a pattern of racketeering that included drug trafficking,
arson, fraud, influencing state trials, and bribing police.48 Turkette was
convicted and, on appeal to the First Circuit, argued that RICO “was intended
to protect legitimate business enterprises from being preyed upon and taken
over by racketeers.”49 And, since the association-in-fact was “completely
criminal,” “RICO does not apply.”50 The First Circuit agreed and held that a
wholly criminal enterprise did not fit within § 1961(4), which defines the
term.51
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that
[t]here is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the
definition: an enterprise includes any union or group of
individuals associated in fact. On its face, the definition
appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Abrams, supra note 16, at 51.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
Id.
United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 897 (1st Cir. 1980).
Id. at 898.
Id.
Id. at 899.
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within its scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises than
it does legitimate ones. Had Congress not intended to reach
criminal associations, it could easily have narrowed the sweep
of the definition by inserting a single word, “legitimate.” But
it did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a
group of individuals was not covered by RICO if the purpose
of the enterprise was exclusively criminal.52
Although it framed its reasoning for this conclusion in terms of language,
statutory structure, and legislative history, the Court made a policy decision to
read § 1961(4) broadly so as to leave a powerful prosecutorial weapon in place.
Discussions of the First Circuit’s holding make this reasonably clear: e.g.,
“[w]hole areas of organized criminal activity would be placed beyond the
substantive reach of the enactment.”53 But, as Lawrence Solan remarks, “it is
wrong to say that ‘enterprise’ could not be understood to include only legitimate
businesses. Generally speaking, that is how the word is used, and the statute’s
definition is not really very helpful.”54 In any event, Turkette essentially
doubled the lines of attack available to prosecutors in their war on organized
crime.55
For the moment, we can set Turkette aside because it had little immediate
impact on civil litigation, which generally involves more-or-less legitimate
organizations. But subsequent interpretations of Turkette’s holding, as we’ll
see, have proved influential.
IV. CONTAINING THE EXPLOSION: CIVIL RICO IN THE COURTS
Judicial hostility to civil RICO is well-documented. This hostility is
expressed in two ways. First, we find courts placing restrictions on the scope
of the statute; second, in moments of candor, judges sometimes overtly express
their dissatisfaction—annoyance even—with the statute.56 With respect to
52. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981). One of the leading commentators
labels the Courts positions as “absurd,” failing to “concede the obvious,” and otherwise inadequate.
SMITH & REED, supra note 16, ¶ 3.02[4].
53. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 589.
54. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 79 (1993).
55. SMITH & REED, supra note 16, ¶ 3.02[1] n.1.1 (noting that within two years after Turkette,
prosecutions doubled).
56. David B. Sentelle, Civil RICO: The Judges’ Perspective, and Some Notes on Practice for
North Carolina Lawyers, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 145, 146–47 (1990). Judge Sentelle, former Judge on
the D.C. Circuit, addressed the almost “universally” held disfavor federal judges have regarding civil
RICO in the first two pages of the article, specifically referencing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Wall Street
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containment strategies, the results have been mixed, with some falling at the
Supreme Court and others still in active use. Broadly speaking, these strategies
have focused on interpretations and applications of RICO’s open-textured
“enterprise” and “pattern of racketeering” definitions, as well as civil RICO’s
injury, causation, and standing requirements.
After Turkette, it was unclear what a wholly criminal organization must
look like to qualify as an association-in-fact enterprise. There’s a general sense
that lower courts—in government prosecutions—were generally confronted
with criminal organizations that either were the Mafia or were structured like
the Mafia in that they had, for example, a leadership structure, membership
criteria, and initiation rites.57 So, the question of whether something as loose
as a conspiracy could qualify as an association-in-fact remained open. 58 In civil
litigation, though, that was often not the case, so courts devised a fairly standard
touchstone for sorting genuine “associations” from groups merely collaborating
in the commission of crimes.59 To wit, an association-in-fact must:
• Have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of
racketeering;
• Be an ongoing organization;
• Function as a continuing unit as shown by a hierarchical or
consensual decision-making structure.60

Journal article, Get RICO Cases out of my Courtroom, Justice Marshall’s dissent in Sedima v. Imrex,
and Justice Scalia’s concurrence in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
57. See United States v. Gigante, 982 F. Supp. 140, 145 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); United States v.
Pungitore, 15 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
58. See 18 U.S.C § 1961(4) (“[E]nterprise includes . . . any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”) (emphasis added).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 770 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that an enterprise
requires proof “(1) that the enterprise is an ongoing organization with some sort of framework for
making or carrying out decisions; (2) that the various associates function as a continuing unit; and (3)
that the enterprise be separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages”) (quoting
United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2003)); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842,
855 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that an enterprise requires “some continuity of structure and of personnel”
and “an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering
activity”). But see, e.g., United States v. Goldin Indus. Inc., 219 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000)
(finding that an enterprise is “an association of individual entities, however loose or informal, that
furnishes a vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate crimes”).
60. Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995); Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l AFLCIO, 901 F.2d 404, 433 (5th Cir. 1990). The third factor is sometimes referred to as a requiring
“enterprise continuity,” which shares a conceptual relationship with “pattern continuity,” discussed
below.
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This rubric held up for thirty years or so, but in 2009, the Supreme Court
revisited Turkette and “clarified” it in a way that broadened the scope of
associations-in-fact well beyond what had persisted in the lower courts.61 The
Court stated the question presented as “whether an association-in-fact
enterprise . . . must have an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the
pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.”62 The Court said “yes”
but went on to define “structure” in a generic way, thereby suggesting that an
association-in-fact enterprise need only have three watered-down features: “[1]
a purpose, [2] relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and [3]
longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s
purpose.”63 As a consequence, the Court has reopened what most had
considered a settled question, and its holding will no doubt spawn civillitigation disputes for years to come, especially now that some “conspiracies”
may qualify as associations in fact.64 65

61. See Gordon, Clarity and Confusion, supra note 3, at 704–08.
62. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 940–41 (2009) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
63. Id. at 946; see also id. at 952 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is clear from the statute and our
earlier decisions construing the term that Congress used ‘enterprise’ in these provisions in the sense of
‘a business organization,’ . . . rather than ‘a venture,’ ‘undertaking,’ or ‘project’.”).
64. Bell v. Kokosing Indus., Inc., No. 19-53-DLB-CJS, 2020 WL 4210701, at *30 (E.D. Ky.
July 22, 2020). Plaintiffs, homeowners, alleged the Defendants, the City, and contracted waste
management companies “were all part of an enterprise with ‘a common unlawful purpose of evading
waste disposal fees at a licensed landfill by wrongly classifying soil at the sewer project as noncontaminated and then hauling and placing such soil on residential property.” Id. The court, applying
the three-factor association-in-fact framework, found there were not sufficient facts to suggest the
existence of a RICO enterprise. Id.; see also Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 738
(5th Cir. 2019) (applying rule promulgated in Turkette, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff
insufficiently showed existence of a RICO enterprise because plaintiff failed to show an “ongoing
organization, formal or informal, that functions as a continuing unit”). Courts that have recently
attempted to differentiate conspiracies from enterprises appear to have done so by focusing on the
broad continuity and purpose requirements articulated in Boyle. See, e.g., United States v. Christensen,
828 F.3d 763, 780 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Boyle, 556 U.S. at 944–45) (“[T]he definition of a RICO
enterprise has ‘wide reach’ and is to be ‘liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.’”).
65. Boyle, 556 U.S. at 947. The Court blurred well-established line between conspiracies and
enterprises by finding that the “beyond the pattern of racketeering” phrase is ambiguous:
This phrase may be interpreted in least two different ways, and its correctness
depends on the particular sense in which the phrase is used. If the phrase is
interpreted to mean that the existence of an enterprise is a separate element that
must be proved, it is of course correct . . . . On the other hand, if the phrase is
used to mean that the existence of an enterprise may never be inferred from the
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But, even giving way to Boyle, there are plenty of good arguments to be
launched against the sort of association-in-fact that is often pled in a civil RICO
case.66 After all, Edmund Boyle joined up with a “core group” that committed
scores of bank robberies throughout the 1990s. Under even a lay view of
“organized crime” or a “criminal enterprise” this “group” fits the bill. But
Boyle’s type of organization isn’t what is alleged in a typical civil RICO case.67
There, the alleged association-in-fact is usually a group of business entities like
corporations (sometimes coupled with individuals), not the sort of “crew”
alleged in Boyle.68 The propriety of that pleading tactic was open prior to Boyle
and remains so today. Here’s why.
A. What is Included in § 1961(4)—the Definition of “Enterprise?”
According to RICO’s definitions, “‘enterprise’ includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”69 Most of
this poses no interpretive dilemma: there’s general agreement that (1) an
“individual,” (2) a “partnership,” (3) a “corporation,” (4) an “association,” (5)
any “other legal entity,” and a (6) “group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity” can be an “enterprise.” But there’s a syntactic
ambiguity caused by the way the words are laid out in the definition. Is “union”
modified and therefore limited by the prepositional phrase “of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity?” Or does “union” mean
labor/trade union or something else? Then, too, is the entire list to be read as
evidence showing that persons associated with the enterprise engaged in a pattern
of racketeering activity, it is incorrect.
Id.
66. See, e.g., Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 178 F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1999) (“That is a
conspiracy, but it is not an enterprise unless every conspiracy is also an enterprise for RICO purposes,
which the case law denies.”); see also Boyle, 556 U.S. at 950 (“Section 1962(c) demands much more
[than proof of an ordinary conspiracy]: the creation of an ‘enterprise’—a group with a common purpose
and course of conduct—and the actual commission of a pattern of predicate offenses.”).
67. See infra note 75 and accompanying text where courts in civil RICO cases have held the term
enterprise to encompass not only an amoeba-like infrastructure that controls a secret criminal network
but also a duly formed corporation that elects officers and holds annual meetings.
68. E.g., Ouwinga v. Benistar 419 Plan Servs., Inc., 694 F.3d 783, 794–95 (6th Cir. 2012)
(holding that insurance companies, law firms, lawyers, and insurance agents can also form a RICO
enterprise); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 652 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding an association-in-fact
RICO enterprise existed between a law firm and a medical practice); United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d
1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding a group or union consisting solely of corporations or other legal
entities can constitute an “associated-in-fact” enterprise).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
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an illustrative or an exhaustive definition? This only matters when civil RICO
litigation intersects with the holding in Turkette. As I suggested above,
government prosecutors and plaintiffs’ lawyers have come to use RICO in
different ways. (Unsurprisingly, after RICO became law, Mafia victims did not
rush to bring civil claims to recover for protection rackets and so forth—the
obvious risk of winding up in a New Jersey landfill provided a sufficient
disincentive). When the Government brings a criminal RICO claim, its aim is
almost always to try and convict individuals. A civil plaintiff, by contrast,
almost always wants to obtain a money judgment from a solvent defendant—
usually a business entity.
But the civil plaintiff can’t usually sue, for example, a corporation and
name that corporation as the enterprise. This is so because of the rule—still
standing after Boyle—that § 1962(c)—which, for reasons we’ll discuss later, is
the most commonly alleged RICO violation—requires a plaintiff to plead a
distinction between the “person” (the Defendants) and the “enterprise.”70 This
distinction arises because § 1962(c) makes it illegal to operate or manage an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering and, obviously enough, a
corporation can’t operate or manage itself through a pattern of racketeering.
Thus a pleading impediment: to state a subsection (c) violation, the alleged
RICO person and the alleged RICO enterprise must be “two distinct entities.”71
In practice, this presents a heady bar because it prevents a plaintiff from alleging
an identity between a group of “conspirators” and the enterprise and between

70. E.g., Lynn v. McCormick, 760 F. App’x 51, 53 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Cedric Kushner
Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001)) (“As to the enterprise requirement, a plaintiff
must ‘allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a ‘person’; and (2) an ‘enterprise’ that
is not simply the same ‘person’ referred to by a different name.’”); see also Walker v. Beaumont Indep.
Sch. Dist., No. 1:15-CV-379, 2017 WL 928459, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2017) (“To establish an
enterprise, a plaintiff must plead the existence of an entity separate and apart from the pattern of
racketeering activity.”), aff’d, 938 F.3d 724, 752 (5th Cir. 2019).
71. United States v. Mongol Nation, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting
Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001)) (upholding principle that “under
[RICO] one must allege and prove the existence of two distinctive entities: (1) a ‘person’; and (2) an
‘enterprise’ that is not simply the same ‘person’ referred to by a different name”); Condos Bros. Constr.
v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co., 280 F. Supp. 3d 349, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citations omitted)
(upholding the distinctiveness requirement in that “a corporate entity may not be both the RICO person
and the RICO enterprise under section 1962(c)”).
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the named defendants and the enterprise.72 73 To slip over the bar, plaintiffs
often name a corporation as a defendant and as part of an association-in-fact
enterprise.74 The tie back to Turkette emerges because—but-for the inclusion
72. Vaguely asserting that only “some” of the defendants form the enterprise is no cure. This is
the sort of “open-ended” description of the enterprise that courts routinely reject on vagueness grounds.
E.g., United States v. Johnson, 825 F. App’x 156, 170 (5th Cir. 2020). Although the facts of this case
could not support a finding of fatal vagueness, the defendant argued RICO’s enterprise requirement
was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to the specific case because “terms such
as . . . ‘enterprise’ . . . provide no guidance as to what conduct the statute prohibits.” Id. This argument
“rel[ied] principally on Justice Scalia’s concurrence in H.J. Inc v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.”
Id. (citations omitted). While the court recognized that “today’s Supreme Court is not shy about
employing the vagueness doctrine to second-guess otherwise valid legislative judgments[,]” the court
cited ample precedent to uphold this requirement as constitutional. Id. In any event, merely removing
some defendants from the alleged enterprise does not solve a plaintiff’s “identity” problem. See St.
Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 224 F.3d 425, 447 (5th Cir. 2000); Andrews v. Am. Nat. Red
Cross, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 2d 673, 687 (W.D. Tex. 2001). Courts now focus on “separateness” to fulfil
the distinctiveness requirement. CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 974 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir. 2020)
(holding that various distinct shell companies satisfied the distinctiveness requirement where “nothing
[exists] in RICO that requires more ‘separateness’ than that” and reasoning that otherwise, an
individual could “avoid RICO liability by using shell companies to conduct criminal enterprises”).
73. Tronsgard v. FBL Fin. Grp., 312 F. Supp. 3d 982, 995 (D. Kan. 2018) (stating that “the
‘person’ and the ‘enterprise’ engaged in racketeering activities must be distinct entities[,]” and
elaborated that “a defendant corporation, acting through its subsidiaries, agents, or employees typically
can’t be both the RICO ‘person’ and the RICO ‘enterprise’”); see also Bradley v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 625, 652 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (noting that association-in-fact consisted of defendants
and stating that “[s]uch identity of elements is impermissible for a RICO claim under § 1962(c)”);
Robinson v. Standard Mortg. Corp., 191 F. Supp. 3d 630, 639 (E.D. La. 2016) (quoting Williamson,
224 F.3d at 447 (5th Cir. 2000)) (“To get around having a corporation named as both a RICO defendant
and a RICO enterprise, many plaintiffs have charged the corporation as being part of an associationin-fact enterprise and also as a RICO defendant. Courts have roundly criticized this formulation.”).
74. See FMC Int’l A.G. v. ABB Lummus Glob., Inc., No. H-04-3896, 2006 WL 213948, at *9
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2006).
FMC’s own allegations defeat the distinctiveness requirement under § 1962(c).
FMC alleges in its Original Federal Complaint that ABB and Heerema are RICO
persons, and that the JV, which is a joint venture between ABB and Heerema, is
a RICO enterprise. FMC then alleges that ABB and Heerema “have acted as
RICO enterprises.” Because FMC’s allegations demonstrate that there is no
distinction between the RICO persons and the purported RICO enterprise(s),
FMC has not stated a RICO viable claim under § 1962(c).
Id. The only exception to the non-identity rule is that a living person can be a defendant and part of an
association-in-fact:
There is a slim exception to the rule that the RICO person must be separate from
the RICO enterprise. “Courts have routinely required a distinction when a
corporation has been alleged as both a RICO defendant and a RICO enterprise,
but a similar requirement has not been mandated when individuals have been
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of illegitimate organizations in the definition of enterprise—a plaintiff couldn’t
name a corporation as a defendant and as part of an association-in-fact because
the identified association is usually alleged to do only illegal acts, despite the
corporate member itself being legitimate.75
Without laboring an issue that I fully swabbed out in another article,76 the
argument against including corporations in associations in fact is “that the use
of the word ‘individual’ in [RICO’s] definition of enterprise . . . refer[s] only to
a [living] person.”77 Plain meaning and structural points support this position.78
And this was the position that seemed to gain traction at oral argument in
Mohawk Industries v. Williams, the most recent case presenting the issue to the
named as defendants and as members of an association-in-fact enterprise.” That
rule does not apply here, as the . . . . Plaintiffs’ claim only implicates the
corporate defendants.
Bradley, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 652 n. 52 (citation omitted) (dismissing RICO claims because, in part,
plaintiffs had “not identified RICO persons separate from their alleged enterprise”).
75. Plaintiffs do this because a corporation cannot be employed by or associated with an
enterprise if it is the enterprise, which is a required element of a § 1962(c) claim. See Schofield v. First
Commodity Corp., 793 F.2d 28, 29–30 (1st Cir. 1986). Thus, plaintiffs allege that the corporation is
the defendant and part of an association-in-fact to get around the person-enterprise barrier and still
keep the corporation in as the deep-pocket defendant. Id.
76. Gordon, Of Gangs and Gaggles, supra note 3, at 973.
77. Starks v. Chuhak & Tecson, P.C., No. 17-62366 CIV-COHN/SELTZER, 2019 WL
10060337 at *8 (S.D. Fla., Jan. 18, 2019). The court dismissed the defendants’ argument, based on
United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), “that the use of the word ‘individual’ in the
statutory definition of an enterprise must refer only to a natural person,” by referencing Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Boeing Co., 357 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1364 (M.D. Fla. 2005) in holding that “the trend
has clearly been in favor of permitting associations-in-fact to include corporations.” Starks, 2019 WL
10060337 at *8.
78. Compare Individual, WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 615 (1986) (“a
single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution”) with Individual, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 843 (9th ed. 2009) (Individual means either “[e]xisting as an indivisible entity” or “[o]f
or relating to a single person or thing, as opposed to a group.”). Dictionaries from the time of RICO’s
adoption are to similar effect. See Brief for Petitioner at 12–13, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547
U.S. 516 (2006) (No. 05-465), at *12–13 [hereinafter Mohawk Petitioner’s Brief]; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4); NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 46:6 (7th ed. 2010) (“A statute should be construed so that effect [is given] to all its provisions, so
that no part [will be] inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . . No clause, sentence or word
shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if a construction can be found which will give
force to and preserve all the words of the statute.”); Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)
(quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)) (“[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons [is]
that ‘[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’”); SINGER, supra note 78, § 46.6 (“The same words
used twice in the same act are presumed to have the same meaning.”); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561, 569–70 (1995).
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United States Supreme Court.79 Nonetheless, nothing approaching a consensus
around the Mohawk position has emerged, and plenty of supporting arguments
and counterarguments remain to be explored.80 At the end of the day, although
“enterprise” is included in the RICO’s “definitions” section, its “definition” is
not really so in the sense of laying out necessary and sufficient conditions for
something to qualify as an “enterprise.”81 So what we find is a trail of court
cases showing judges in search of the meaning of the word, often made in the
context of criminal law, where the “tough on crime” policy dictates a broad
reading that will put more criminals in jail.82 The associated cost appears in
civil litigation, where there’s an accepted premise that the “enterprise” concept
is unbounded (i.e., “[t]here is no restriction upon the associations embraced by
the definition”).83 Stated thusly, it comes as no surprise that lower courts have
assumed, without much analysis, that associations-in-fact made up of or
including of corporations are proper.84

79. See Oral Argument, Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S. 516 (2006) (No. 05-465),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/05-465 [https://perma.cc/SE7K-LQ8C]. The case was fully briefed
and then argued, but the Court subsequently remanded the case without decision for reconsideration in
light of its opinion in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451 (2006). See Mohawk Indus., 547
U.S. at 516.
80. Gordon, Of Gangs and Gaggles, supra note 3, at 973.
81. See Clark D. Cunningham, Judith N. Levi, Georgia M. Green & Jeffrey P. Kaplan, Plain
Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561, 1589–90 (1994). The definition is thus what Solan
calls a “fuzzy concept at the margins.” Id. at 1588.
82. Solan suggests that courts have interpreted RICO under a “law enforcement model,” by
which he means that courts “have been generous with prosecutors and stingy with civil plaintiffs in
interpreting various provisions of the statute.” Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional
Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209, 2255 (2003). This phenomenon was no doubt exacerbated by
the fact that the interpretations of RICO’s substantive provisions first occurred in criminal cases, where
the courts were inclined to give the Government a fair amount of leeway in its fight against crime.
And, as Smith & Reed note, “[t]he happenstance that civil RICO was not ‘discovered’ by the plaintiff’s
bar until the 1980’s has had an important influence on the development of RICO jurisprudence. Had
the much deplored explosion of civil RICO litigation occurred ten years earlier, the courts would have
interpreted the statute much more restrictively than they did with only criminal RICO prosecutions on
their docket.” SMITH & REED, supra note 16, ¶ 3.02[1] & n.19 (noting that “[o]nly a handful of civil
RICO cases were brought between 1970 and 1980”).
83. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–81 (1981).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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B. Pattern of Racketeering
RICO’s “pattern” requirement is loosely defined in § 1961(5) as two
predicate acts within ten years of each other.85 Early on, many courts
(especially in the criminal context) read the definition literally and required
only that minimal showing.86 But after Sedima, most courts demanded
something more—viz., a showing that the alleged predicate acts are “related”
and “continuous”—terms whose meaning is not self-evident.87 H.J., Inc.
attempted to clarify Sedima, but with limited success.88 All we can say for
certain is that the “relatedness” of predicate acts is a fact only rarely litigated,
and the focus has shifted to “continuity,” which can be demonstrated in two
ways. Under H.J., Inc., “‘[c]ontinuity’ is both a closed and open-ended
concept, referring either to a closed period of repeated conduct, or to past
conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.”89
This attempt at clarification has invited multiple tests that unfortunately
have a facts-and-circumstances air to them. About all we can say with certainty
is that in a closed-ended scheme (i.e., one that is completed), duration will be a
factor (nearly dispositive in some courts) in the continuity analysis.90 By
contrast, in an open-ended scheme “past conduct that by its nature projects into
the future with a threat of repetition” must be shown.91 And of course the
“threat of repetition” factor is not susceptible to an easily identifiable litmus
test. As a practical matter, the “continuity” analysis seems to ensnare civil
claims based on allegations of a fraudulent scheme targeting a single victim to
85. “‘[P]attern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of
which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act or racketeering activity[.]”
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
86. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981), superseded by rule on other
grounds, FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b), as recognized in United States v. Huntress, 956 F.2d 1309, 1314–15
(5th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted) (“[T]he Government must prove . . . that the participation was
through a pattern of racketeering activity, i.e., by committing at least two acts of racketeering
activity . . . [t]he two predicate crimes need not be related to each other but must be related to the affairs
of the enterprise.”).
87. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (citations omitted)
(commenting on the pattern requirement and noting that “it is this factor of continuity plus relationship
which combines to produce a pattern”).
88. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236–37 (1989).
89. Id. at 241.
90. Id. at 242 (“A party alleging a RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed
period by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.” (emphasis
added)).
91. Id. at 241.
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obtain a particular benefit, even if the scheme entails multiple predicate acts.92
On the other hand, repeated infliction of economic injury upon a single victim
of a single scheme is sufficient to establish continuity.93
C. Special Standing Problems in Private Litigation
i. Proof of Injury
Although, as I’ve mentioned, the language of § 1964(c) of RICO is derived
from § 4 of the Clayton Act, about the only thing that’s clear is that each gives
some private plaintiffs standing to sue for otherwise criminal violations that
cause them injury.94 Because the meaning of § 4 had been litigated for over
half a century at the time of § 1964(c)’s adoption, it’s reasonable to ask whether
the two sections should be viewed in the same light. Both sections provide that
“any person injured in his business or property by reason of” a substantive
antitrust or RICO violation may seek treble damages.95 But this apparent
simplicity “belies the complexity of the many questions it has raised.”96 Read
literally, any person injured (even remotely or unforeseeably) by prohibited
conduct can state a claim under either statute. But courts have concluded that
the right to sue cannot be so open ended and to staunch the litigation flow have
erected multiple embankments to keep claims off the docket.97
92. Grace Int’l Assembly of God v. Festa, 797 F. App’x 603, 605 (2d Cir. 2019) (citations
omitted) (“The court must also consider the number and variety of predicate acts, the presence or
absence of multiple schemes, and the number of participants and victims.”).
93. Metaxas v. Lee, 503 F. Supp. 3d 923, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (finding that a single scheme
with a single victim may be sufficient to establish continuity requirement); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v.
Boatright R.R. Prods., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-01787-AKK, 2018 WL 2299249, at *8 (N.D. Ala., May 21,
2018) (finding that open-ended continuity does not require a showing of multiple schemes or victims).
94. The federal antitrust laws—at least as interpreted by the courts after the 1970s—have
migrated from a model condemning a wide range of conduct to one condemning only conduct that
causes deleterious economic effects. Broadly stated, “Congress’s objectives included not only the
economic goal of low prices and high quality brought about through competition, but also social and
political ends.” David F. Shores, Antitrust Decisions and Legislative Intent, 66 MO. L. REV. 725, 747
(2001). We see this view enshrined in the earliest cases, which found all restraints—reasonable or
not—illegal. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). This view
quickly eroded in favor of condemning only “unreasonable” restraints, and by the time we arrive at the
late the 1970s, the Supreme Court migrated to the view that antitrust claims must be grounded in
“demonstrable economic effect.” Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
95. 18 U.S.C § 1964(c).
96. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 16.1, 804 (5th ed. 2016).
97. Id. (“By its language, § 4 appears to give a cause of action to every person who is injured by
a cartel or overcharging monopolist. The courts have concluded that the statute cannot be as broad as
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Under the U.S. competition statutes, one potent element of antitrust
standing is the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate “antitrust injury,” a
concept tracing to Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.98 That case
arose after the defendant acquired (in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act,
according to the plaintiff) a number of failing bowling alleys that—after the
acquisition—competed with plaintiff and harmed its business.99 This struck the
Court as a claim of injury flowing from too much competition, and, therefore,
contradictory to the purpose of the antitrust laws, which “were enacted for ‘the
protection of competition, not competitors.’”100 After Brunswick:
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of
the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful. The
injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the
violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation.101
It is true that courts look to antitrust precedent when formulating
approaches to RICO standing.102 But there’s a major caveat—the Supreme
it purports to be, however, and they have devised ways to limit its scope.”); see also, e.g., Ill. Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977) (holding that, in the context of illegal overcharging, only the
overcharged direct purchaser—and not others down the line—constitute a person “injured in his
business or property”).
98. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). Courts also require,
as an element of antitrust standing, a plaintiff to show that it is an “efficient enforcer” of the antitrust
laws. In the RICO context, this doctrine still matters, but it tends to be examined in the context of
proximate cause. See Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Off. Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
99. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 479–80.
100. Id. at 488 (emphasis added) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962) (“At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the failing centers petitioner preserved
competition, thereby depriving respondents of the benefits of increased concentration.”).
101. Id. at 489; accord HOVENKAMP, supra note 96, at 806; but see Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (ruling in favor of the manufacturer—rather than the smaller
retail store—in holding that the court should apply the rule of reason to vertical non-price restraints);
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 927 (2007) (acknowledging that “a
basic antitrust objective” is “providing consumers with a free choice about” “lower prices [rather than]
more service,” but ruling in favor of the manufacturer—rather than the smaller retail store—in holding
that a court should apply the rule of reason to vertical price restraints).
102. Waste Mgmt. of La., L.L.C. v. River Birch, Inc., 920 F.3d 958, 970 (5th Cir. 2019) (“the
[Supreme] Court recognized that ‘antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from
ambiguous evidence[.]’”); Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 731 F. 3d 556, 563 (6th
Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (“With respect to § 1964(c), [its] limits have often been derived from the
similarities between RICO and the antitrust laws. Courts have therefore looked to § 4 of the Clayton
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Court fairly quickly rejected the invitation to engraft a Brunswickian conception
of injury onto RICO and thereby demand proof of “racketeering injury” and
“competitive injury.”103 In Sedima, the Court found nothing in the statute
suggesting that relief would be available only for a “racketeering injury,” a
concept that the Court found vague and “unhelpfully tautological.”104 So
although it is a commonplace of statutory interpretation and application that
like statutory language should be interpreted pari passu,105 we’ve just seen that
that doesn’t always happen. Why not here?
Two reasons spring to mind. First, as I’ve already noted, the government
enforcement and private litigation aims under RICO are less congruent, for
instance, than they are under the federal antitrust laws, where criminal and civil
litigation both target conduct that interferes with open competition. Indeed, as
Hannah Buxbaum observes, “The antitrust laws deliberately adopt the private
attorney general as a mechanism for law enforcement . . . . This statutory
framework reveals Congress’ intention to motivate a level of private
enforcement that would ensure significant compliance with the antitrust

Act; its predecessor, § 7 of the Sherman Act; and cases construing these statutes in order to identify
limits to the civil remedy afforded by § 1964(c).”).
103. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498–99 (1985) (“In borrowing its
‘racketeering injury’ requirement from antitrust standing principles, the court below created exactly
the problems Congress sought to avoid.”); see also Cohen v. Trump, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1069 (S.D.
Cal. 2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court [in Sedima] rejected the Second Circuit’s attempt to read RICO to
impose liability only against defendants who had been criminally convicted, and only for what the
court called ‘racketeering injury.’”). The Sedima Court also rejected a reading of § 1964(c) under
which a claim could only be predicated on a prior conviction. 473 U.S. at 488 (“[A] prior-conviction
requirement cannot be found in the definition of ‘racketeering activity.’ Nor can it be found in § 1962,
which sets out the statute’s substantive provisions.”).
104. 473 U.S. at 494.
105. In the context of determining the meaning of a statute, “construction” and “interpretation”
are disputed terms, that here, for simplicity’s sake, I’ll treat synonymously. One of the main debates
is whether judges should consider the legislature’s intent. See Cheryl Boudreau, Matthew D.
McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and the Intentional(ist) Stance, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 2131, 2131 (2005) (“[Legal] scholars have pondered whether individuals and
collectivities can have intentions; they have asked whether it is possible for judges to discover the
legislature’s actual intent; and they have questioned whether legislative intent should play a role in
judges’ interpretations of statutes.”). Another debate swirls around the use of a statute’s legislative
history as an interpretive aid. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of
Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2000) (“In the long-running debate over methods
of statutory interpretation, no issue receives more attention than legislative history.”). See also
discussion infra Part IV.E.
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laws.”106 And in this context, “Congress was successful, as private actions have
constituted a substantial portion of antitrust litigation.”107
This success has come in the form of a division of labor with respect to
violations of the Sherman Act: the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice focuses on “hard core” violations like price fixing whereas private
enforcers target (1) the recovery of damages in tag-along class actions
following the announcement of criminal antitrust indictments, or (2)
anticompetitive theories that the government rarely prosecutes like tying,
boycotts, exclusive dealing, and other theories that are easily recognizable as
potential antitrust violations.108
Second, as Abrams has documented, private RICO was ill-conceived and
ill-considered: “In the months preceding the OCCA’s enactment, Congress paid
virtually no attention to the likely efficacy of private RICO relief because RICO
included only the government’s civil and criminal remedies until late in the
deliberation process.”109 Even worse, “When the private remedy was inserted
shortly before the final House and Senate votes on the OCCA bill, the
lawmakers were racing against the clock to pass crime legislation before
adjourning . . . [so as] to appear before the electorate as ‘tough on
crime’ . . . .”110 This lack of deliberate consideration led to a private remedy
that “would have little or no effect on the fight against organized crime and
racketeering.”111
The disjunction between criminal prosecutions and private lawsuits is
facially apparent. Government prosecutions look like what one would find
under an anti-Mafia criminal statute: indictments typically charge violent crime
rings, union infiltration, gambling, and so forth.112 And the looseness inherent
in RICO’s drafting is tightened by the Justice Manual, which curbs any
prosecutorial predilection to read the statute in novel and highly expansive ways

106. Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in
Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 219, 223 (2001).
107. Id.
108. See id. at 222–23.
109. Abrams, supra note 16 at 35.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 36.
112. Compare e.g., United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 940 (2d Cir. 1991) (involving
indictments with 24-counts that included, among other things, “murder, conspiracy to murder, heroin
trafficking and conspiracy to distribute heroin”), and United States v. Dote, 150 F. Supp. 2d 935, 940
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (involving an indictment that “allege[d] a sequence of gambling offenses”), with
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 484 (1985) (involving counts of mail and wire fraud).
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by, for example, stating criteria that must be met, requiring centralized approval
before an indictment is issued, and prohibiting use of RICO as a plea bargaining
tool.113
Private RICO litigants are not similarly burdened and, by contrast, almost
never bring claims rooted in stereotypical gangster conduct or tagging along on
criminal RICO indictments;114 typical complaints almost always assert claims
of fraud in business or consumer transactions.115 To be sure, there are ways in
which organized criminals gain competitive advantages over legitimate
businesses (e.g., selling stolen goods at a discount or not paying and collecting
taxes), but those are marginal cases. Indeed, one can persuasively argue that
had Congress not joined mail and wire fraud to the list of predicate acts, civil
RICO litigation would be more-or-less nonexistent.116 In any event, just
because courts declined to place “racketeering injury” requirements on private
litigants does not mean there are no specialized standing requirements, two of
which need at least brief mention, if only because they explain why § 1962(c)
predominates in civil RICO litigation.
ii. § 1962(a) and (b) Problems
For a couple reasons, civil RICO claims tend to be brought under § 1962(c).
First, §§ 1962(a) and (b) pose particular standing problems. Section 1962(a),
113. U.S.J.M. 9-110.310, Considerations Prior to Seeking Indictment, Dept. Justice
(https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-110000-organized-crime-and-racketeering#9-110.300)
[https://perma.cc/7H7A-H56E].
114. To amplify one of my earlier remarks, I would point to Abrams’s rhetorical question, “How
many ‘private attorneys general’ would have the temerity to sue organized crime members and
racketeers in open court for treble damages?” Abrams, supra note 16, at 36.
115. See Gordon, Rethinking, supra note 3, at 323 n. 20. See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Watson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1031 (W.D. Ark. 2000) (quoting Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S.
179, 191 (1997)) (“‘[A] high percentage of civil RICO cases, unlike typical antitrust cases, involve
fraud claims.’”). As of 1985, “of the 270 known civil RICO cases at the trial court level, 40% involved
securities fraud, 37% common-law fraud in a commercial or business setting, and only 9% ‘allegations
of criminal activity of a type generally associated with professional criminals.’” Sedima, 473 U.S. at
499 n.16 (quoting Arthur F. Mathews, Judah Best, John K. Tabor, Richard E. Nathan & Andrew B.
Weissmann, REPORT OF THE AD HOC CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF
CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 55–56 (1985)). Additionally, “[r]oughly two fifths of
all federal civil actions under RICO are based on charges that the defendant committed mail or wire
fraud.” Horace D. Nalle, Jr., Civil RICO Claims Predicated on Mail or Wire Fraud: The
Indispensability of Reliance, 109 BANKING L.J. 272, 272 (1992).
116. In a review of civil RICO decisions through the statute’s first decade and a half, Abrams
notes that despite occasional claims based on crimes like arson or extortion, “[n]o private plaintiff,
however, apparently had ever filed a civil RICO action against a member of an organized crime
family.” Abrams, supra note 16, at 53.
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generally speaking, prohibits the investment of racketeering-derived income in
an enterprise.117 Most courts—but not all, especially those in the Fourth
Circuit—hold that to state a claim a plaintiff must have suffered an “investment
injury,” which is to say an injury flowing from the investment itself rather than
the predicate acts.118 Section 1962(b), which prohibits acquisition of an interest
in an enterprise through racketeering acts, similarly requires pleading and proof
of an “acquisition injury.”119 Second, given these obstacles, private plaintiffs
drift to § 1962(c), which—as we’ve already noted—is a more natural fit
anyway, because civil RICO litigation typically turns on allegations of fraud in
insurance, franchise, or other commercial transactions that are perpetrated
through an enterprise.120 And because fraud allegations have assumed a place
of prominence, causation has become a principal point of contention in many
civil RICO cases.

117. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
118. Kolar v. Preferred Real Est. Invs., Inc., 361 F. App’x 354, 360 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations
omitted) (“Because the objectives of § 1962(a) are ‘directed specifically at the use or investment of
racketeering income,’ it ‘requires that a plaintiff’s injury be caused by the use or investment of income
in [an] enterprise.’”).
119. Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (explaining that there
must be a “nexus between the claimed RICO violations and the injury suffered by the plaintiff; [f]or
subsection (a), this means that the injury must flow from the investment of racketeering income into
the enterprise. . . . As to subsection (b), a plaintiff must show that his injuries were proximately caused
by a RICO person gaining an interest in, or control of, the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.”).
120. E.g., Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2010) (fraud in connection
with collection of sales taxes); Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem., Co., 553 U.S. 639, 643–45 (2008)
(fraud and bid rigging); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 454–55 (2006) (fraud in
connection with collection of sales taxes); see also CGC Holding Co. v. Hutchens, 974 F.3d 1201,
1214 (10th Cir. 2020) (victims of an advance-fee loan scam filed a class action and had the judgment
rendered by the jury upheld by the Tenth Circuit); Crawford’s Auto Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 945 F.3d 1150, 1159 (11th Cir. 2019) (civil RICO claims based on defendants allegedly
improperly attempting to suppress amounts they were obligated to pay for automobile repairs, but the
court—in dismissing the action—held that “[d]efendants are not liable for any omissions of material
fact unless they have a duty to disclose”); In re Celexa & Lexapro Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 915
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019) (RICO claim asserted against pharmaceutical manufacturer for promoting
unauthorized “off-label” use of prescription antidepressants for minors); Jaye v. Oak Knoll Vill.
Condo. Owners Ass’n, 751 F. App’x 293, 293 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding conclusory allegations failed to
plead mail or wire fraud with requisite particularity); Watson, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1031 (quoting Klehr,
521 U.S. at. 191) (noting higher percentage of fraud claims in RICO cases than in typical antitrust
cases).
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iii. General Standard for Proof of Causation by Holmes
To recover for RICO violations, private plaintiffs must demonstrate injury
“by reason of” those violations,121 a standard that the U.S. Supreme Court first
interpreted in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.122 The open
question at the time was whether “but-for causation” is sufficient to confer
standing under § 1964(c).123 The Court acknowledged that the statute’s
“language can . . . be read to mean that a plaintiff is injured ‘by reason of’ a
RICO violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that the
defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the defendant’s
violation was a ‘but for’ cause of plaintiff’s injury.”124 But the Court rejected
this reading because: (1) § 1964(c) is modeled on § 4 of the Clayton Act,125 and
(2) § 4 had been held to “incorporate common-law principles of proximate
causation.”126 The Holmes Court thus concluded this general tort-law reasoning
should extend to § 1964(c).127
Holmes settled the causation question at a level of generality, but it didn’t
mandate how plaintiffs must plead and prove causation, especially in
misrepresentation cases.128 Two issues came to the fore after Holmes, both of
which were important to class actions, as plaintiffs sought a tool with which to
certify nationwide classes, which had become more difficult after a series of
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court
. . . .”).
122. Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 272–73 (1992).
123. See id. at 266–67, 266 n.12.
124. Id. at 265–66 (footnotes omitted).
125. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267 (citations omitted) (“We have repeatedly observed that Congress
modeled § 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws [and] § 4 of the Clayton
Act, which reads in relevant part that ‘any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”); Id. at 266
(“This construction is hardly compelled, however, and the very unlikelihood that Congress meant to
allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover persuades us that RICO should not get such an expansive
reading.”). See Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 15).
126. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267–68 (stating that Congress’s use of § 7 language in § 4 has been
interpreted by the Court to indicate the same congressional intent, and therefore, the Court has
previously held that § 4 required a showing of proximate causation).
127. Id. at 268 (citations omitted). This makes good sense, given that civil RICO is in essence
a statutory tort. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE,
AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 1318 (14th ed. 2020).
128. See infra note 134.
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circuit opinions in the 1990s.129 Put simply, the questions are whether
“reliance” is an element of a RICO-fraud claim and, if so, is “victim” reliance
required.130 After fifteen years, in a series of three cases, the Court began to
clarify the causation muddle that had emerged in the lower courts.
a. Proof of Causation: Anza
In Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., the Court considered whether a
competitor can be “injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation,”131 where the alleged predicate acts are mail and wire fraud, but a
third-party was defrauded and the competitor did not rely on the fraudulent
conduct.132 Under Holmes,133 the Court said this is insufficient.134 A brief
review of the facts shows why.

129. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740–41 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that multistate
class would be decertified because the federal district court failed to consider how variations in state
law would affect predominance and superiority, district court’s predominance inquiry did not include
consideration of how trial on the merits would be conducted, and the class independently failed the
superiority requirement); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that class certification was precluded due to concerns for protection of the Seventh Amendment, undue
and unnecessary risk of entrusting determination of potential multibillion dollar liabilities to single
jury, and questionable constitutionality of trying diversity case under legal standard in force in no
state).
130. Sandwich Chef of Tex., Inc. v. Reliance Nat’l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205, 224 (5th Cir.
2003) ( “disagree[ing] with the district court that the fraud-on-the-regulator theory is a common issue
of fact by all class members” that may be proved at trial because the “regulator’s reliance on the
fraudulent act would not alone be enough to result in a direct and contemporaneous injury to a
policyholder that satisfies RICO’s proximate cause requirement”).
131. 547 U.S. 451, 458 (2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court . . . .”)).
132. Id. It’s worth noting that the Anza scenario probably is the type of competition-harming
behavior that Congress had in mind when it created a private right of action. Gordon, Of Gangs and
Gaggles, supra note 3, at 976–77 (discussing the legislative history and its focus of crime and unfair
competition).
133. Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1992) (holding that a plaintiff may
sue under § 1964(c) of the RICO Act only if the alleged RICO violation was the proximate cause of
the plaintiff’s injury).
134. Anza, 547 U.S. at 460–61 (citations omitted) (“A RICO plaintiff cannot circumvent the
proximate-cause requirement simply by claiming that the defendant’s aim was to increase market share
at a competitor’s expense. When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central
question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries. In the instant
case, the answer is no. We hold that Ideal’s § 1962(c) claim does not satisfy the requirement of
proximate causation.”).
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Ideal sued its chief competitor, National, alleging that National didn’t
charge New York’s sales tax to its cash-paying customers and therefore
submitted fraudulent sales-tax returns, thus allowing it to reduce prices without
suffering a profit decline.135 The Court said that Ideal could not make out its
§ 1962(c) claim because “[t]he direct victim of this conduct was the State of
New York, not Ideal. It was the State that was being defrauded and the State
that lost tax revenue as a result.”136 Thus, although “Ideal assert[ed] it suffered
its own harms when [National] failed to charge customers for the applicable
sales tax . . . [t]he cause of Ideal’s asserted harms . . . is a set of actions
(offering lower prices) entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation
(defrauding the State).”137 Anza clarified a great deal, but it didn’t hold that
third-party fraud automatically fails for want of first-party reliance, although
many read it that way.138
135. Id. at 454.
136. Id. at 458.
137. Id. The Court further reasoned as follows:
The attenuation between the plaintiff’s harms and the claimed RICO violation
arises from a different source in this case than in Holmes, where the alleged
violations were linked to the asserted harms only through the broker-dealers’
inability to meet their financial obligations. Nevertheless, the absence of
proximate causation is equally clear in both cases.
Id. at 458–59.
138. See, e.g., Nat.-Immunogenics Corp. v. Newport Trial Grp., 2020 WL 7263544, at *8 (C.D.
Cal., Nov. 23, 2020). “At the center of the instant dispute [whether reliance must be plead to avoid a
judgment on the pleadings] is the effect that Bridge has had within the District and Circuit on the
necessary elements a party must prove to establish liability under RICO. It is clear to the Court that
reliance is not an element to sustain a cause of action under RICO.” Id. (citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond
& Indem. Co., 533 U.S. 639, 648 (2008)). “However, Bridge also established that while a plaintiff
need not show ‘first-party’ reliance on a defendant’s fraudulent acts to prevail, ‘none of this is to say
that a RICO plaintiff who alleges injury ‘by reason of’ a pattern of mail fraud can prevail without
showing that someone relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations.’” Id. (quoting 553 U.S. at 658–
59); see also Painters & Allied Trades Dist. v. Takeda Pharms. Co., 943 F.3d 1243, 1259 (9th Cir.
2019) (holding that plaintiffs adequately alleged the reliance necessary to satisfy RICO’s proximate
cause requirement in a case against a pharmaceutical company based on their refusal to change warning
labels on a diabetes drug or to otherwise inform consumers after the company learned that the drug
caused an increased risk of bladder cancer); Devon Drive Lionville, L.P. v. Parke Bancorp, Inc., 791
F. App’x 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2019) (first quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268; then quoting Bridge, 553
U.S. at 657–58) (“Under RICO, proximate causation requires ‘some direct relation between the injury
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’ Though it requires reliance, the reliance need not be by
the plaintiff himself; usually, a plaintiff must show ‘that someone relied on the defendant’s
misrepresentations.’”); Brown v. Cassens Transp. Co., 492 F.3d 640, 643–46 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated,
554. U.S. 901, rev’d on remand, 546 F.3d 347, 357 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that employees’ claims
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b. Proof of Causation: Bridge
If Anza could be (over)read to mean that allegations of third-party fraud
cannot support a civil RICO claim, the Supreme Court put that worry to rest in
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co.139 The case arose out of a bid-rigging
scheme involving the sale of county tax liens.140 Concerned that liens would
not be apportioned fairly, the county (1) required each “tax buying entity” to
submit bids in its own name, (2) prohibited it from using “agents, employees,
or related entities” to submit simultaneous bids, and (3) required a sworn
certification of the first two conditions.141
The defendants allegedly violated this rule, furnished fraudulent affidavits,
and thereby received a disproportionate share of the liens, all at the expense of
that employer’s mail- and wire-fraud scheme to deny them worker’s compensation benefits failed
because they did not plead reliance); James Cape & Sons v. PPC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 403–04
(7th Cir. 2006) (relying on Anza, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of claims for
lack of proximate causation and noted that a direct causal connection is especially warranted where
immediate victims can be expected to pursue their own claims); G & G TIC, LLC v. Ala. Controls,
Inc., No. 4:07-CV-162, 2008 WL 4457876, at *4–5 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2008) (dismissing contractor’s
RICO claims and finding that the case is more analogous to Anza than to Bridge because the party
directly injured by the defendants’ alleged conspiracy to defraud the government through a bidding
scheme was not the contractor, but the government and the contractor’s injuries were cast in doubt by
the fact that the defendant did not win all the contracts); Chaz Concrete Co., LLC v. Codell, No. 3:0352-KKC, 2007 WL 1741934, at *11–12 (E.D. Ky. June 14, 2007), rev’d, 545 F.3d 407, 409 (6th Cir.
2008) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims that they were injured by the defendants’ misrepresentations to a
state agency for failure either to plead reliance or provide evidence of reliance as required under Anza);
Leasure v. AA Advantage Forwarders, No. 5:03-CV-181-R., 2007 WL 925829, *9–10 (W.D. Ky. Mar.
23, 2007) (interpreting Anza as “emphasizing that under RICO’s proximate cause analysis set out in
Holmes, a RICO plaintiff may not recover for damages sustained by a third party” and consequently
finding that the “[p]laintiff cannot recover under RICO for any harms he may have indirectly sustained
as a result of the alleged direct injuries incurred by the United States Government”); Downstream
Env’t, LLC v. Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Auth., No. H-05-1865, 2006 WL 1875959, at *7 (S.D. Tex.
July 5, 2006) (finding that where the cause of plaintiff’s asserted injury (competitor charging lower
prices) was distinct from the alleged RICO violations (competitor operating without a required license),
plaintiff could not meet the proximate-cause requirement); Corp. Healthcare Fin., Inc. v. BCI Holdings
Co., 444 F. Supp. 2d 423, 429 (D. Md. 2006) (“[A] civil RICO complaint is vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss if it fails to allege . . . an adequate causal nexus between that injury and the predicate acts of
racketeering activity alleged.”); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (D.N.J.
2006) (finding that when the plaintiff’s asserted injury (underpayment of wages) was distinct from the
alleged RICO violation (harboring, transporting and encouraging illegal aliens) plaintiff failed to show
proximate cause); Uni-Rty Corp. v. Guangdong Bldg., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (S.D.N.Y 2006)
(finding plaintiff failed to allege proximate cause when its injury would have occurred regardless of
defendant’s conduct).
139. Bridge, 553 U.S. at 651–60.
140. Id. at 639.
141. Id.
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the plaintiffs and other bidders.142 This presented the Supreme Court with a
question that Anza left open: namely, “whether first-party reliance is an element
of a civil RICO claim predicated on mail fraud.”143 For civil RICO to have a
reliance requirement, that requirement must flow from one of two sources: the
statutory-fraud predicates or § 1964(c).144 The former was a question already
answered by recent precedent: “[u]sing the mail to execute or attempt to execute
a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate act of
racketeering under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation.”145
So, if reliance is an element, then “it must be by virtue of § 1964(c),” which
provides the private right of action.146 But—unlike common-law fraud—
reliance (let alone first-party reliance) is not a stated element of § 1964(c),
which is stated solely in terms of causation (“by reason of”).147 The Court thus
dispatched the notion that a plaintiff must show that it relied on a
misrepresentation; nonetheless, a RICO plaintiff is unlikely to prevail “without
showing that someone relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations.”148 As a
collateral consequence, Bridge opened the door to class certification in cases
that once would have failed on “predominance” grounds because individual
issues of reliance would have swamped all others. 149
c. Proof of Causation: Hemi
The whipsaw between Anza and Bridge once again led to overcorrections
in RICO-causation decision-making.150 In Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New
142. Id.
143. Id. at 646.
144. Id. at 649.
145. Id. at 648–49 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (“The common-law
requiremen[t] of ‘justifiable reliance’ . . . plainly ha[s] no place in the [mail, wire, or bank] fraud
statutes.”)).
146. Id. at 649.
147. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C § 1964(c)).
148. Id. at 658–59 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 66 (1995)).
149. Vine v. PLS Fin. Servs., Inc., 331 F.R.D. 325, 338 (E.D. Tex. 2019) (quoting Torres v.
S.G.E. Mgmt. L.L.C., 838 F.3d 629, 645 n.74 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc)) (certifying a class and stating
that “predominance is not defeated merely because ‘other important matters will have to be tried
separately’”).
150. See, e.g., Torres, 838 F.3d at 638 (“this understanding of the causation requirement for
fraud-based RICO claims—that such claims, unlike most common law fraud claims, do not require
proof of first-party reliance—largely dooms the Defendants’ attempt to identify individual issues of
causation sufficient to preclude a finding of predominance.”); St. Germain v. Howard, 556 F.3d 261,
263 (5th Cir. 2009); Harris Cnty. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2020 WL 5803483, at *11 (S.D. Tex., Sept. 29,
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York, the Court revisited the issue of causation in the context of
misrepresentations made to someone other than the plaintiff.151 This time the
facts laid out a long causal chain: Hemi sold cigarettes to New York City
residents; Hemi was legally obliged to submit purchasers’ names to the State
but didn’t; without the reports from Hemi, the State couldn’t meet a contractual
obligation to give the purchaser names to the City; without receiving names
from the State, the City couldn’t determine which customers owed taxes; and
without that determination, the City could not target non-paying customers;
therefore, the City claimed it was injured to the extent of the unpaid taxes.152
Thus cast as a for-want-of-a nail-a-kingdom-was-lost narrative, one easily
sees, as in Anza, a yawning gap between direct harm-producing conduct and
fraud-producing conduct.153 The Court therefore refused to “extend RICO
liability to situations where the defendant’s fraud on the third party (the State)
has made it easier for a fourth party (the taxpayer) to cause harm to the plaintiff
(the City).”154 And the foreseeability of the harm proved insignificant:
proximate cause in this context depends on “directness” not “foreseeability.”155
2020). The district court, in upholding the rule that reliance is not a requirement of causation, held that
Harris County’s claim that the defendants “misleadingly relabeled rebates so as to avoid paying them
to Harris County” and that the defendants’ conspiracy to artificially raise the price of insulin was
sufficient to show “a direct relationship between the alleged conduct and their injury.” Harris Cnty.,
2020 WL 5803483, at *11.
151. Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010).
152. Id. at 4–5.
153. Id. at 2–-3. In his dissent, Justice Breyer opined that Hemi is not like Anza because “the
kind of harm that the plaintiff alleged [in Anza] is not the kind of harm that the tax statutes [in Hemi]
primarily seek to prevent.” Id. at 28. Rather, the plaintiffs in Hemi “alleged a kind of harm
(competitive injury) that tax violations do not ordinarily cause and which ordinarily flows from the
regular operation of a competitive marketplace.” Id. at 28.
154. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
155. In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 452 F. Supp. 3d 745, 764 (N.D. Ohio 2020). The
court held that while “the creation of an opioid crisis foreseeably led to increased costs for hospitals,”
this “does not end the inquiry.” Id. “Under RICO law, the injury must also be a direct consequence
of a Defendant’s injurious conduct.” Id. Court concluded that West Boca “sufficiently alleged at least
one plausibly direct and foreseeable chain of causation from injurious conduct to alleged injury to
survive a motion to dismiss for lack of proximate cause.” Id.; Doe v. Trump Corp., 385 F. Supp. 3d
265, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[I]n the RICO context, the focus is on the directness of the relationship
between the conduct and the harm,’ and whether the connection is attenuated by substantial intervening
factors or third party conduct. Insofar as civil RICO cases are concerned, a court’s proximate cause
inquiry does not ‘go beyond the first step.”) (citations omitted). Compare Chaz Concrete Co., LLC v.
Codell, No. 3:03-52-KKC, 2010 WL 1227750, at *11 (E.D. Ky., Mar. 29, 2010) (dismissing plaintiffs’
“scheme to defraud” allegations claiming third-party injury from misrepresentation even though they
plead reliance because, under Hemi, “the Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of showing that the
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In sum, Hemi may fairly be read to hold that proof of civil RICO causation
cannot be premised on an “interdiction” theory—i.e., one depending on an
allegation that fraud on a third party (often a government regulator) prevented
that party from intervening and thereby preventing the plaintiff’s injury.
As the matter now stands, we know that but-for and proximate causation
are elements of a fraud-based civil RICO claim, that first-party reliance is not
(although it is a handy way to demonstrate causation), and that directness of
injury from a misrepresentation is critical. But we also know that causation
factors, as in tort cases generally, can be devilishly difficult to apply in
individual RICO cases, and that, therefore, causation will remain a contested
issue in most cases.156
D. Does RICO Have Borders?
As with antitrust law, there are often questions as to the extraterritorial
reach of RICO. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 157 the Supreme
Court sought to answer two of them: “First, do RICO’s substantive prohibitions,
contained in § 1962, apply to conduct that occurs in foreign countries? Second,
does RICO’s private right of action, contained in § 1964(c), apply to injuries
that are suffered in foreign countries.”158 As a default, the “basic premise of
Defendants’ fraud caused the Plaintiffs’ injuries by simply showing that ‘the concept of the injury was
well known to the defendants’ and, thus, foreseeable . . . . Instead, the Plaintiffs must produce evidence
of a direct relationship between their injuries and the fraud”), with Johnson v. KB Home, 720 F. Supp.
2d 1109, 1118 (D. Ariz. 2010) (reversing dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint because even though
plaintiffs did not plead reliance, they sufficiently pleaded that defendants’ actions were “a direct cause
of their injuries and a ‘substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation’” (citation omitted)).
156. Compare Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 82 Health Care Fund v. Takeda Pharm.
U.S.A., 943 F.3d 1243, 1260 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that health insurer and consumers plausibly
alleged the element of proximate cause in alleging civil RICO violations based on pharmaceuticals
company’s refusal to change warning label on diabetes drug or otherwise inform consumers after they
learned that the drug caused an increased risk of bladder cancer), and St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc.
v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 301 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that plaintiffs, a group of hospitals
and their related health care networks, adequately alleged defendants’, another hospital and hospital
system, misrepresentation proximately caused their injury when plaintiffs alleged that defendants
submitted fraudulent claims for reimbursement of “extraordinary expenses” incurred for treating
uninsured patients), with Empire Merchs., LLC v. Reliable Churchill LLLP, 902 F.3d 132, 143–44 (2d
Cir. 2018) (holding that smuggling liquor into New York, as asserted racketeering activity, was not
proximate cause of lost sales suffered by exclusive distributor), and Collier v. LoGiudice, 818 F. App’x
506 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that a former restaurant employee failed to adequately allege proximate
cause regarding both the alleged workers’ compensation insurance scheme and the alleged tax evasion
scheme against the restaurant’s owner and general manager).
157. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325 (2016).
158. Id.
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our legal system that, in general, ‘United States law governs domestically but
does not rule the world.’”159
The Court had at its disposal a previously developed “two-step framework
for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.”160 The first step entails a look at a
statute’s language to see whether it gives an unequivocal, affirmative indication
of extraterritorial reach.161 If not, then the second step determines whether the
facts alleged push the case into the statute’s “focus.”162 RICO presents a
particular challenge because—although nothing in § 1962 itself makes an
unequivocal statement of extraterritorial application—many predicate acts do
expressly apply with extraterritorial force.163 This was enough for the Court to
conclude that “Congress’s incorporation of these (and other) extraterritorial
predicates into RICO gives a clear, affirmative indication that § 1962 applies to
foreign racketeering activity.”164 What this means is that § 1962 can apply
extraterritorially, but only to the extent “that the predicates alleged in a
particular case themselves apply extraterritorially.”165 Stated differently, RICO
covers some foreign racketeering activity—viz., “a pattern of racketeering that
includes predicate offenses committed abroad, provided that each of those
offenses violates a predicate statute that is itself extraterritorial.”166
So, we know that foreign conduct can support a substantive, criminal
violation of RICO. But this doesn’t end the inquiry with respect to a civil claim
under § 1964(c), to which the Court found that it must “separately apply the
presumption against extraterritoriality to RICO’s [civil] cause of action despite
our conclusion that the presumption has been overcome with respect to RICO’s
substantive prohibitions.”167 Here, the European Union invited the Court to
interpret § 1964(c) in pari materia to its direct ancestor, § 4 of the Clayton Act,
which—under the Court’s precedents—allows recovery for injuries suffered
abroad.168 But the Court declined the invitation, noting that—although the
Clayton Act sometimes offers “guidance in construing § 1964(c)”—it had “not

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 2100 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
Id. at 2101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2102.
Id. at 2094.
Id. at 2103.
Id. at 2106.
Id. at 2095.
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treated the two statutes as interchangeable.”169 As the matter now stands,
absent domestic injury, a prosecutable criminal RICO violation will fail as a
civil claim.170
E. RICO’s Remedies
i. Equitable Relief
Whether private plaintiffs can obtain injunctions and other forms of
equitable relief171 is another RICO conundrum arising from the statute’s unclear
169. Id. at 2109.
170. To see how lower courts have ruled on the domestic injury requirement post RJR Nabisco,
see City of Almaty v. Khrapunov, 956 F.3d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The Ninth Circuit has not yet
addressed the question of how to determine whether an injury is domestic or foreign after RJR Nabisco,
and we need not do so today. That is because Plaintiff’s alleged injury is merely a consequential effect
of its admittedly foreign injury, and not an independent injury cognizable under § 1964(c).”);
Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 905 F.3d 694 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that an investigations firm
that assisted foreign companies, doing business in China, with American anti-bribery regulations
compliance did not suffer a domestic injury as required to establish a civil RICO claim when in their
allegation that a multinational healthcare company destroyed their business and prospective business
ventures as result of its bribery practices in China); Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 874 F.3d 806, 806–07 (2d Cir.
2017) (holding that an alleged scheme to: (1) steal funds held in a foreign bank account and launder
stolen money using bank accounts in the United States and elsewhere did not allege a domestic injury,
(2) misappropriate funds held in New York bank account owned by plaintiff did allege a domestic
injury, and (3) misappropriate bearer shares owned by principal did allege a domestic injury).
171. Fleetwood Servs., LLC v. Complete Bus. Sols. Grp., Inc., No. 18-268, 2019 WL 5422884,
at *4 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 23, 2019) (“The Third Circuit has not addressed injunction for private plaintiffs
under RICO. Other courts are split on whether private plaintiffs in RICO actions can request equitable
relief. Even if injunctions are available for private plaintiffs in RICO actions, courts have found that
private plaintiffs must still show future irreparable harm.”). Compare Smith v. FirstEnergy Corp., 518
F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1126 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (showing the use of
traditional injunctive relief requirements and stating that “[e]quitable relief is generally available under
§ 1964(c), and no court has concluded that this excludes any particular type of equitable relief. . . .
Defendants provide no authority that supports the proposition that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under
§ 1964(c) by alleging an imminent and ascertainable injury”), with Hengle v. Asner, 433 F. Supp. 3d
825, 884–85 (E.D. Va. 2020) (“By providing the government with authority to institute proceedings
under § 1964 and not providing private plaintiffs with the same authority, Congress expressed an intent
that the general grant of injunctive power to the courts in § 1964(a) not apply in cases involving only
private plaintiffs. Indeed, by providing a cause of action only if a private plaintiff has suffered
monetary damages, Congress implicitly precluded the possibility of equitable relief for such plaintiffs,
because—as has been the case since the conception of courts of equity — to obtain equitable relief, a
plaintiff must have an inadequate remedy at law.”). An interesting, though rarely discussed, issue is
whether declaratory relief is available in a RICO case. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201, states that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court . . . may
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). One
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drafting. The first case to take up the question, Religious Technology Center v.
Wollersheim,172 held that such relief is not available. What we find in the text
is that § 1964(a) is a broad grant of equitable jurisdiction to federal courts, that
§ 1964(b) allows the government to seek equitable remedies, and that § 1964(c)
allows private plaintiffs to recover treble damages, costs, and fees.173 There’s
no dispute, then, that “[i]n contrast to part (b), there is no express authority to
private plaintiffs to seek the equitable relief available under part (a).”174
Ultimately, the Court held that “[t]he legislative history mandates us to hold
that injunctive relief is not available to a private party in a civil RICO action.”175

might think that this statute would provide a basis for seeking declaratory relief independent of what’s
provided in the RICO statute itself, but the few cases addressing the issue do not bear that out. Instead,
the cases treat a declaration as-if it were an injunction and either allow or deny declaratory relief for
the same reasons that an injunction would be allowed or denied. See Johnson v. Collins Ent. Co., 199
F.3d 710, 726 (4th Cir. 1999) (“There is substantial doubt whether RICO grants private parties . . . a
cause of action for equitable relief. This doubt is especially acute in light of the fact that Congress has
declined to authorize injunctive remedies for private parties.” (internal citations and quotations
omitted); Galaxy Distrib., Inc. v. Standard Distrib., Inc., No. 2:15–cv–04273, 2015 WL 4366158, at
*5 (S.D.W. Va. July 16, 2015) (“RICO does not provide for [the plaintiff’s] requested relief of
declaratory judgment and permanent/preliminary injunctions”); Am. Med. Ass’n v. United Healthcare
Corp., 588 F. Supp. 2d 432, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Based upon the weight of Second Circuit authority
and Congress’s failure to address the issue within the statutory language itself, this Court will not infer
that the right to injunctive and declaratory relief exists for private litigants under Section 1964 of
RICO.”); Aarona v. Unity House Inc., No. 05–00197, 2007 WL 1963701, at *16–17 (D. Haw. July 2,
2007) (finding that declaratory relief is not available to a private party after acknowledging that the
Ninth Circuit has prohibited injunctive relief but has not addressed declaratory relief); In re Managed
Care Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1282–83 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding the reasoning in Nat’l Org. For
Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001), persuasive to authorize both injunctive and
declaratory relief); Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F. Supp. 987, 994 (1984) (finding that “there is
nothing in the language, structure or legislative history of private civil RICO to suggest Section 1964(c)
was meant to grant private plaintiffs” declaratory and injunctive relief). The same may be said of other
remedies of an equitable or quasi-equitable nature. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22–24
(1983) (concluding that some things are forfeitable under some RICO subsections that are not
forfeitable under others); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (finding that RICO does not explicitly include disgorgement and therefore it is not available to
the Government); United States v. Carson, 52 F.3d 1173, 1182 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the
availability of disgorgement is limited to the cases where there is a finding “that the gains are being
used to fund or promote the illegal conduct, or constitute capital available for that purpose”).
172. 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986).
173. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)–(c); Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1082.
174. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at 1082.
175. Id. at 1084.
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A number of years later, National Organization For Women, Inc. v.
Scheider emerged as the leading challenger of Wollersheim.176 There, the court
emphasized that Wollersheim reached its conclusion by “relying largely on [its]
reading of the statute’s legislative history,”177 which “recent Supreme Court
precedent teaches . . . is a particularly thin reed on which to rest the
interpretation of a statute.”178 The Court thus concluded that plain statutory
language permitted injunctive relief and that the proffered legislative history
could not trump it.179
As the matter presently rests, (with no definitive word from the Supreme
Court), courts that have three choices: follow Wollersheim, follow NOW, or
find a way to avoid the issue. After Wollersheim (and even to date), most courts
have followed Wollersheim.180 But this does not mean that there’s a consensus
or anything approaching a prevailing view.181 In fact, “it is impossible to
176. See Nat’l Org. For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 699 (7th Cir. 2001), rev’d on
other grounds, 537 U.S. 393 (2003) [hereinafter “NOW”].
177. Id. at 695.
178. Id. at 699 (citing Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 169–
70 (2001) (noting that “[f]ailed legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to
rest an interpretation of a prior statute. A bill can be proposed for any number of reasons, and it can
be rejected for just as many others”); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994) (“Congressional inaction lacks persuasive significance because several
equally tenable inferences may be drawn from such inaction, including the inference that the existing
legislation already incorporated the offered change.”).
179. See NOW, 267 F.3d at 699.
180. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIVIL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL ATTORNEYS 33
n.29 (2007) (“The majority of courts to decide this issue have [followed Wollersheim by holding that]
private parties may not obtain equitable relief.”).
181. As I already noted, the leading commentator, Professor G. Robert Blakey, sharply criticized
the Wollersheim opinion at the time and has continued the drumbeat as recently as October 2014, in
connection with Chevron v. Donziger. Brief for Professor G. Robert Blakey as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant at *10, *14, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 833 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2016) (“This
amicus agrees with the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Scheidler that private parties have the power to
obtain the full range of equable remedies. . . . Scheidler is correctly decided . . . .”). For recent
commentary on this issue, see Hengle v. Asner, 433 F. Supp. 3d 825, 882–84 (E.D. Va. 2020) (“Circuit
courts that have directly addressed whether § 1964 provides for injunctive and declaratory relief in
private RICO actions have reached opposite conclusions.” “Having considered these opinions
[Wollersheim and NOW] and district court opinions addressing the same issue, the Court finds the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 1964 more persuasive, though without relying on legislative
history.”); In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 3:17-cv-699, 2020 WL 831552, at *3 (D.N.J., Feb. 20, 2020)
(“The Third Circuit has not directly addressed whether RICO allows for a private right of equitable
relief.” The plaintiff was unable “to point to any cases within [the] Circuit or District” that adopted
Dozinger or Scheidler; thus, the court “decline[d] to stray from the weight of persuasive authority and
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discern whether these courts chose to follow the Ninth Circuit’s position simply
because for fifteen years Wollersheim was the only pronouncement on this issue
or because the Ninth Circuit’s logic is more persuasive than the Seventh
Circuit’s.”182 And we must note that many courts following Wollersheim were
bound to it (because they’re in the Ninth Circuit)183 or—though technically
following Wollersheim on the availability of injunctive relief under § 1964—
nonetheless found alternative ways to grant it in RICO cases.184 Finally, at least

h[eld] that a private party may not seek equitable relief under RICO.”); In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804, 2019 WL 4194296, at *6 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 4, 2019) (citations omitted)
(“Neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit has squarely addressed whether RICO provides an
equitable remedy to private plaintiffs, and there is a Circuit split on the question. Unlike the very brief
dicta in Ganey, more recent Circuit cases undertaking deeper analysis conclude RICO does provide
equitable relief.”); B2Gold Corp. v. Christopher, No. 1:18-cv-1202, 2019 WL 4934969, at *16 (E.D.
Va., July 10, 2019) (“Yet, this Court declines to follow the Second Circuit and instead refers to the
language of the statute. Injunctive relief is not appropriate for a RICO offense because § 1964(c)
makes no mention of injunctive relief.”). See also Bakala v. Krupa, No. 9:18-cv-2590-DCN-MGB,
2021 WL 3508585, at *8 (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2021) (citations omitted) (denying request for injunctive
relief “[b]ecause the Fourth Circuit has expressed doubt that injunctive relief is available to private
parties under 18 U.S.C. § 1964”). Before so holding, the court took time to compare NOW with
Wollersheim. See id. at *7–8 (citations omitted).
182. Huyer v. Wells Fargo & Co., 295 F.R.D. 332, 344 (S.D. Iowa 2013) (footnotes omitted).
183. See, e.g., Comm. to Protect our Agric. Water v. Occidental Oil & Gas Corp., 235 F. Supp.
3d 1132, 1169 n.7 (E.D. Cal. 2017); Cohen v. Trump, 200 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2016);
Holmes High Rustler, LLC v. Gomez, No. 15–cv–02086–JSC, 2015 WL 4999737, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 21, 2015); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Khan, No. 12–01072–CJC, 2012 WL 12887395, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 28, 2012); Aarona v. Unity House Inc., No. 05–00197, 2007 WL 1963701, at *16–17 (D.
Haw. July 2, 2007).
184. Hawaii’s “baby” RICO statute, allowing equitable relief, states:
The circuit courts of the State shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited
to: ordering any person to divest oneself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any
enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments
of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging
in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, or ordering dissolution
or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of
innocent persons.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 842-8(a) (1984); Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1355 (3d
Cir. 1989) (deciding not to reach the issue of injunctive relief under RICO because the plaintiff’s statelaw claims also provided for injunctive relief); Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, 714 F. Supp. 460, 476
(D. Kan. 1988) (noting that it found Wollersheim persuasive, but the plaintiff also sought injunctive
relief under its common-law claims); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1505(a) (West 1995) (same);
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 607 (1990) (providing a similar “baby” RICO statute to Hawaii’s with slightly
different wording); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-43-9 (West 1986) (providing a similar “baby” RICO statute
to Hawaii’s with slightly different wording).
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one major recent case, Chevron v. Donziger185 concluded that equitable relief
is available under § 1964(c), “largely for the reasons stated by the Seventh
Circuit opinion in NOW I.”186
ii. Other Relief and Remedies
Although the issue is not as complicated as the availability of equitable
relief, the pedigree of § 1964 and the larger purpose of § 1964 unsettle the
question of how properly to calculate RICO damages. Under one view, the
nature of the underlying predicate acts should control.187 For instance, in a
fraud-based RICO case, damages should be determined by borrowing
analogous common-law fraud theories of recovery.188 Under the other view,
given that § 1964(c) is based on § 4 of the Clayton Act, the borrowing should
come from antitrust precedents.189 If this is so, then the “yardstick” and
“before-and-after” measures familiar in antitrust cases should hold sway. Both
the predicate act and Clayton Act approaches are not an ideal fit with RICO,
principally because it’s difficult to square common-law precedents with groups
of predicate acts, and antitrust remedies are designed to compensate
competitive injuries, which do not reach all corners of RICO’s remedial
purposes. The latter point is revealed most starkly when a court bars a claim
for a pecuniary loss that it categorizes as a “personal” injury, rather than “injury
to business or property.”190
Another knotty issue arises in the space between the “one-satisfaction rule”
and RICO’s treble damages provision. The question is one of ordering: does a
prior recovery apply before or after trebling? For example, suppose a plaintiff
sues two defendants. One settles for $1 million and the other goes to trial and
185. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 833 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2016).
186. Id. at 137.
187. SMITH & REED, supra note 16, ¶ 10.04[3].
188. James v. Meinke, 778 F.2d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 1985). In a RICO securities fraud case, there
was found to be no difference between the value of the stock when purchased and its purchase price,
but, following a predicate act-based approach, the Fifth Circuit upheld a jury award based on payments
plaintiff made on subsequent loan guarantees to the ailing company, by holding that such damages are
compensable as “consequential” damages. Id.
189. Willie McCormick & Assocs., Inc. v. Lakeshore Eng’g Servs., Inc., No. 12-cv-15460, 2018
WL 1884716, at *4 (E.D. Mich., Mar. 29, 2018) (stating that when attempting to calculate damages
the court relied on how “[t]he Sixth Circuit has summarized the degree of certainty required to prove
lost profit damages in an antitrust case”).
190. See Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 847–48 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that RICO’s private
civil action provision does not permit recovery for economic aspects of personal injuries inflicted by
predicate acts involving murder).
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receives an adverse verdict in the amount of $1.1 million. In this scenario, does
the plaintiff recover $300,000 or $2.3 million? There is a split of authority on
the point, but—given RICO’s purpose of punishing criminal conduct that has
civil impact—the better rule would seem to be treble first, deduct second.191
F. A RICO Miscellany
i. Limitations
The RICO statute contains no statute of limitations. In Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc, the Supreme Court “borrowed” the
antitrust limitations period—four years—found in § 4B of the Clayton Act.192
But the Malley-Duff Court did not decide the issue of when a RICO claim
accrues. In Rotella v. Wood, the Court applied an “injury discovery” rule,
although it declined to decide whether it would ultimately choose an “injury
discovery” or “injury occurrence” rule.193 Also undecided are the contours of
the separate accrual, sufficient knowledge, and equitable tolling doctrines
familiar to limitations jurisprudence more generally. Here’s what we do know.
Every federal circuit has adopted a rule “‘under which a new claim accrues,
triggering a new four-year limitations period, each time plaintiff discovers, or
should have discovered,’ the operative event triggering accrual (that is, injury
or injury plus a pattern of racketeering activity).”194 This rule—adopted from
antitrust principles—effectively limits recovery to injuries that occurred within
the four-year statute of limitations.195 And although the Supreme Court has not
explicitly adopted the injury accrual rule, it may tacitly have done so by

191. Compare Uthe Tech. Corp. v. Aetrium, Inc., 808 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding
foreign arbitration awards as well as settlements “constitute partial credits toward the full measure of
damages for which a defendant may be liable under RICO”), and Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006,
1013 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding “[t]he deduction here should be made after trebling”), with HBC Fin.
Corp. v. McPherson, 8 F.4th 335, 345 (5th Cir. 2021) (refusing to award treble damages in RICO action
based on “lost debt” theory of injury because after recovering judgment with interest, the “debt was no
longer lost”); and Com. Union Assurance Co. v. Milken, 17 F.3d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
investors could not maintain a RICO action where they received, in a settlement, the amount they lost
on their investment).
192. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 146–47, 156 (1987).
193. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 554–55, 554 n.2 (2000).
194. SMITH & REED, supra note 16, ¶ 9.01[5][B][V] (quoting Bingham v. Zolt, 66 F.3d 553, 559
(2d Cir. 1995)).
195. See Bingham, 66 F.3d at 560 (stating that “[a] necessary corollary of the separate accrual
rule is that plaintiff may only recover for injuries discovered or discoverable within four years”).
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applying the rule in the context of a federal copyright claim.196 This does not
mean, however, that the Circuits agree on the criteria for defining a separate
accrual. For example, some circuits merely require that there be a “new” injury,
whereas others require that the injury be both “new” and “independent” of prior
injuries outside the statute of limitations.197 One court has even opined that
injuries within the limitations period may not be “entirely unlike” the injuries
sustained prior to the limitations period.198 This seems to be an overreach, and
a path not widely followed.
The “sufficient knowledge” doctrine goes hand in glove with the separate
accrual doctrine.199 Courts generally—after determining when a plaintiff
sustained injury—determine when the plaintiff discovered or should have
discovered the injury. There’s also widespread agreement that actual or
constructive knowledge is sufficient to commence the running of the period.200
But here, too, there’s no agreed-upon formula for deciding when a plaintiff was
put on inquiry notice sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations.201

196. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 671 (2014) (referencing Klehr v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 190 (1997) (“Each [instance of copyright infringement] gives rise to
a discrete ‘claim’ that ‘accrue[s]’ at the time the wrong occurs.”)).
197. Compare Viking Constr. Grp., LLC v. Satterfield & Pontikes Constr. Grp., Inc., No. 1712838, 2018 WL 401182, at *3 (E.D. La., Jan. 12, 2018) (quoting Love v. Nat’l Med. Enters., 230 F.3d
765, 773 (5th Cir. 2000)) (elaborating that the separate accrual rule allows recovery “for injury caused
by the commission of a separable, new predicate act within the limitations period” (emphasis added)),
with Lehman v. Lucom, 727 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[I]f a new RICO predicate act gives
rise to a new and independent injury, the statute of limitations clock will start over for the damages
caused by the new act.” (emphasis added)), and Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 1996),
and Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d 702, 707–08 (3d Cir. 1991).
198. Zalesiak v. UnumProvident Corp., No. 06 C 4433, 2007 WL 4365345, *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
12, 2007) (quoting McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452, 1466 (7th Cir. 1992)).
199. A claim cannot begin to accrue until the plaintiff has “sufficient knowledge.” See Mathews
v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 260 F.3d 239, 250–51 (3d Cir. 2001); Forbes v. Eagleson, 228 F.3d 471,
484 (3d Cir. 2000).
200. See SMITH & REED, supra note 16, ¶ 9.01[5][B][V].
201. The Third Circuit has provided perhaps the most elaborate formula for ascertaining inquiry
notice:
[I]nquiry notice should be analyzed in two steps. First, the burden is on the
defendant to show the existence of “storm warnings” . . . . Second, if the
defendants establish the existence of storm warnings, the burden shifts to the
plaintiffs to show that they exercised reasonable due diligence and yet were
unable to discover their injuries. This inquiry is both subjective and objective.
The plaintiffs must first show that they investigated the suspicious circumstances.
Then, we must determine whether their efforts were adequate—i.e., whether they
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Closely related to the discovery rule is the “equitable tolling” doctrine. As
the Third Circuit has explained:
The discovery rule and the equitable tolling doctrine are similar
in one respect and different in another. The doctrines are
similar in that each requires a level of diligence on the part of
the plaintiff; that is, each requires the plaintiff to take
reasonable measures to uncover the existence of injury. The
plaintiff who fails to exercise this reasonable diligence may
lose the benefit of either doctrine. The two doctrines differ,
however, with respect to the type of knowledge or cognizance
that triggers their respective applications. The discovery rule
keys on a plaintiff’s cognizance, or imputed cognizance, of
actual injury. Equitable tolling, on the other hand, keys on a
plaintiff’s cognizance, or imputed cognizance, of the facts
supporting the plaintiff’s cause of action. Underlying this
difference between the discovery rule and equitable tolling is
the more fundamental difference in purpose between the two
rules. The purpose of the discovery rule is to determine the
accrual date of a claim, for ultimate purposes of determining,
as a legal matter, when the statute of limitations begins to run.
Equitable tolling . . . presumes claim accrual. Equitable tolling
steps in to toll, or stop, the running of the statute of limitations
in light of established equitable considerations.202
Finally, the “fraudulent concealment” doctrine is a distinct species within
the broader equitable tolling genus. It has elements that an invoking plaintiff
must plead—and, as a type of fraud, the plaintiff must do so under the
particularity standards of Rule 9(b).203 Although there is no standard
articulation of the elements of the doctrine, courts typically require affirmative
acts of concealment that in fact prevented a plaintiff exercising due diligence
from discovering the basis of its claim.204
exercised the due diligence expected of reasonable investors of ordinary
intelligence.
Mathews, 260 F.3d at 252 (3d Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted).
202. Forbes, 228 F.3d 471 at 486 (quoting Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38
F.3d 1380, 1390 (3d Cir. 1994)).
203. Dummar v. Lummis, 543 F.3d 614, 621 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Allegations of fraudulent
concealment, like other types of fraud, must be pleaded with particularity.”).
204. Edmonson v. Eagle Nat’l Bank, 922 F.3d 535, 553 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Supermarket of
Marlinton, Inc., v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 1995) (the Fourth Circuit
holds that in order “[t]o satisfy the first element of the fraudulent concealment test, a plaintiff must
‘provide evidence of affirmative acts of concealment’ by defendants.”).
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ii. The PSLRA Exemption and Other Limitations
For many years, a common tactic to enhance the force of a claim for
securities fraud was to bolt-on a civil RICO claim and thereby gain access to
automatic treble damages and attorneys’ fees.205 But in 1995, Congress passed
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which states that “no
person may rely upon any conduct that would have actionable as fraud in the
purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962.”206
Although at first glance this proviso seems straightforward enough, it has led
to vigorous debate over whether Congress intended merely to remove securities
violations as predicate acts, to prevent the recasting of certain securities claims
as mail and wire fraud, or to bar all claims somehow touching on the purchase
or sale of securities.207
Under one recent expression of a touchstone, the court noted that “the fraud
itself must be integral to the purchase and sale of the securities in question.
Conduct that is merely incidental or tangentially related to the sale of securities
will not meet [this] requirement.”208 This more-or-less squares with the
legislative history of the PSLRA, which suggests that although plaintiffs should
not be allowed to recast securities fraud claims as mail or wire fraud claims,
fraudulent schemes that remotely touch on investment injuries should not be
preempted.209 Accordingly, Professor Blakey has proposed a common-sense
solution: if a claim is not actionable under the securities law statutes, RICO
should fill the gap.210 A good deal of confusion in the case law nonetheless
abounds, although it appears that a consensus is recently developing around the
Blakey proposal.211
205. See generally Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.2d
1087 (5th Cir. 1992); Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Integrated Resources Real
Est. Ltd. P’ships Sec. Litig., 850 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Gold v. Fields, No. 92 Civ. 6680,
1993 WL 212672 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993); King v. Gandolfo, 714 F. Supp. 1180 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
206. The PSLRA is inapplicable to persons who have been criminally convicted in connection
with the fraud at issue. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong.
§ 107 (1995) (Codified exception).
207. See In re Platinum-Beechwood Litig., 377 F. Supp. 3d 414, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); SMITH
& REED, supra note 16, ¶ 2.02[4][b].
208. In re Platinum-Beechwood Litig., 377 F. Supp. 3d at 425 (citations omitted) (quoting
Leykin v. AT&T Corp., 423 F. Supp. 2d 229, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
209. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 23 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
210. SMITH & REED, supra note 16, ¶ 2.02[4][b].
211. Plaintiff’s Response to UDF Entities and Theodore F. Etter’s Motion to Dismiss at 9–11,
Megatel Homes, LLC v. Moayedi, No. 3:20-cv-00688-L (N.D. Tex. 2020) (quoting Bald Eagle Area
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Before concluding, it’s worth noting that the PSLRA exclusion is not the
only quirk that can limit a plaintiff’s ability to bring a RICO claim. Four are
worth brief mention: the ability to sue aiders and abettors, reverse-preemption
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the standing to sue of indirect purchasers,
and a defendant’s privileges under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Early on, a number of courts held that a defendant who aids and abets a
civil RICO violation is liable for the violation.212 That still appears to be a
viable position, although it is no longer unequivocal. There are really two
issues at play. First, the Supreme Court held, in Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, that no implied civil right to sue for aiding and abetting exists
under 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.213 Some courts have extended this
reasoning to civil RICO claims; others have not.214 Second, in Reves v. Ernst
& Young, the Supreme Court held that—for purposes of 1962(c) claims—a
defendant must have “participated in the operation or management of the
enterprise.”215 This generally forecloses assertions of liability against true
third-party providers like accounting firms, but it doesn’t foreclose all aiding
Sch. Dist. v. Keystone Fin., Inc., 189 F.3d 321, 330 (3d Cir. 1999) (“In determining whether the RICO
Amendment bars a plaintiff’s RICO claims, ‘the proper focus of the analysis is on whether the conduct
pled as predicate offenses is “actionable” as securities fraud—not on whether the conduct is
“intrinsically connected to, and dependent upon” conduct actionable as securities fraud.’”). The
Second Circuit is one of the few minority jurisdictions that do not abide by the general consensus. See
MLSMK Inv. Co. v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 651 F.3d 268, 280 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding the PSLRA
bars a civil RICO claim “premised upon predicate acts of securities fraud, including mail or wire fraud,
even where the plaintiff could not bring a private securities law claim against the same defendant”
(emphasis added)).
212. Before the 1994 decision in Central Bank, of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164 (1994), many courts, including the Third Circuit, authorized the imposition of civil
liability for aiding and abetting a RICO violation. Early on many courts did so under the reasoning
that “the common law doctrine of aiding and abetting can apply under RICO.” SMITH & REED, supra
note 16, ¶ 6.04[A].
213. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 169–71 (1994)
(holding “a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b)”).
214. Compare In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep Ecodiesel Mktg., Sales Pracs., and Prods. Liab. Litig.,
295 F. Supp. 3d 927, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“It is clear from Central Bank that statutory text is
paramount in determining whether a private cause of action for aiding and abetting is available. . . .
With respect to the civil RICO statute, Congress did not use those terms [aid and abet]. . . . The Court
therefore concludes that a private cause of action for aiding and abetting a RICO violation is
unavailable[.]”), with Belin v. Health Ins. Innovations, Inc., No. 19-61430-CIV-MORENO/SELTZER,
2019 WL 9575236, at *9 (S.D. Fla., Oct. 22, 2019) (citing In re Managed Care Litig., 135 F. Supp. 2d
1253, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2001)) (“[A]lthough Defendants suggest that it is an open question whether
RICO aiding and abetting liability exists in the Eleventh Circuit, this Court has previously
acknowledged controlling precedent holding that it does.”).
215. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993).
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and abetting theories, especially given that aiding and abetting is available for
the federal offenses designated as RICO predicates. This is because many
courts have interpreted Reves to “foreclose [the] application of aiding and
abetting principles to substantive liability under section 1962(c),” but “this does
not bar application of aiding and abetting principles to predicate offenses so as
to hold liable secondary parties.”216 This idea of applying aiding and abetting
principles to the predicate offenses (making it practically work as an extension
of the traditional-tort-causation analysis), rather than to substantive liability
under § 1962, derives support from the general rule, “aiding and abetting
liability is available for all federal offenses,” which “would include the federal
offenses that Congress has designated as RICO predicates.”217
Generally speaking, the McCarran-Ferguson Act leaves regulation of the
“business of insurance” to the states and “reverse” or “inverse” preempts
federal acts of general applicability that otherwise might be found to preempt
state laws regulating the insurance industry.218 RICO is one such act. But
reverse preemption does not throw a blanket over all RICO claims that touch
on insurance. In Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, the Supreme Court implicitly framed
the issue as one of “conflict”:
The federal law at issue, RICO, does not proscribe conduct that
the State’s laws governing insurance permit. But the federal
and state remedial regimes differ. Both provide a private right
of action. RICO authorizes treble damages; Nevada law
permits recovery of compensatory and punitive damages. We
hold that RICO can be applied in this case in harmony with the
State’s regulation. When federal law is applied in aid or
enhancement of state regulation, and does not frustrate any
declared state policy or disturb the State’s administrative
regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not bar the federal
action.219
This formulation invites close scrutiny of the facts alleged and the
regulatory scheme implicated, and not surprisingly a fair amount of

216.
217.
218.
219.

SMITH & REED, supra note 16, ¶ 6.04[A].
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1011.
Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 303 (1999).
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disagreement emerges each time a RICO claim is launched against an insurance
product.220
In Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois, the Supreme Court held—in a case brought
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act—that only direct purchasers of overpriced
goods (i.e., not subsequent purchasers) have standing to sue under the antitrust
laws.221 Courts have for the most part applied Illinois Brick to RICO claims,
especially when the injury alleged flows from a fraudulent overcharge.222
Nonetheless, the matter remains unsettled for at least three reasons. First,
Illinois Brick has been sharply criticized and may well be revisited.223 Second,
many states have passed Illinois Brick “repealers,” so to the extent they have
baby RICO statutes, indirect purchasers may well have standing under those
statutes.224 Third, although the question has not been much litigated, many
indirect victims of RICO violations haven’t purchased anything, so it’s
questionable whether Illinois Brick should apply at all.
Finally, another antitrust doctrine, Noerr-Pennington, immunizes activity
properly characterized as “petitioning” the government and includes lobbying,
litigation, and incidents to either.225 The doctrine has applied much more

220. Compare Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 2d 870, 885–86 (C.D. Cal. 2013)
(the court found the facts in this case weigh “strongly against a finding of reverse-preemption of
plaintiffs’ RICO claims”), with Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut., 601 F.3d 505, 519 (6th Cir.
2010) (finding, under the facts, that applying RICO against insurer would impair Ohio’s insurance
regulatory scheme, as required for reverse preemption).
221. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 (1977).
222. See McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 855 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[A]ntitrust
standing principles apply equally to allegations of RICO violations. The precepts taught by Illinois
Brick . . . apply to RICO claims, thereby denying RICO standing to indirect victims.”) (citations and
internal quotations omitted). See also Hale v. Stryker Orthopaedics, Civ. No. 08-3367, 2009 WL
321579 (D.N.J., Feb. 9, 2009) (holding that plaintiffs who received knee implants manufactured by
defendant did not have standing to allege RICO claims of illegal kickback scheme with surgeons that
artificially inflated implants’ costs because plaintiffs did not purchase implants directly from
defendant).
223. Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 47 P.3d 1119, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)
(reasoning, while tacitly expressing disagreement with the underpinnings of Illinois Brick, that
“[i]nterpreting A.R.S. § 44–1408(B) in this light impels the conclusion that consumers are best
protected when indirect purchasers are permitted to maintain antitrust actions against members of
alleged price-fixing conspiracies”).
224. See id. at 1128 n.11 for states that have adopted Illinois Brick repealers.
225. Randy Gordon, A Question of Fairness: Should Noerr-Pennington Immunity Extend to
Conduct in International Commercial Arbitration?, 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 211 (2008).
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widely than the antitrust context, including RICO.226 Nonetheless, the doctrine
has eroded somewhat in recent years, at least in the lower courts.227 For
example, in United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., the court held that “the
doctrine does not protect deliberately false or misleading statements”—and
this, despite Noerr itself immunizing false statements.228
V. CONCLUSION
Although RICO’s ambiguities and vagaries are well documented and have
been decried for most of its history, Congress has shown scant inclination to do
anything about the situation. Indeed, the most significant Congressional collar
placed on RICO in the last twenty-five years—the preemption provision of the
PSLRA—appeared as part of a more general attempt to tamp down securities
litigation, not as an assault on civil RICO per se. With this history as a guide,
we can safely predict that clarifications of RICO will come from judges—not
legislators—which means that clarifications will emerge not at a stroke but at
the speed of the common law, which is to say glacially and incrementally. But
that’s not necessarily a bad thing. A similar process has unfolded under the
antitrust laws, which have exhibited both resilience and flexibility in the face
of massive technological and social change. So, we—like A. A. Milne’s
river—must wait patiently under the realization that “We shall get there some
day.”229

226. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e conclude that the Noerr–
Pennington doctrine stands for a generic rule of statutory construction, applicable to any statutory
interpretation that could implicate the rights protected by the Petition Clause.”).
227. Relevant Grp., LLC v. Nourmand, No. 2:19-cv-05019-ODW, 2020 WL 2523115, at *5
(C.D. Cal., May 18, 2020) (finding plaintiffs “sufficiently alleged that Defendants’ environmental
lawsuits constitute[d] ‘sham’ litigation as an exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine”
and “[a]ccordingly [that] the Noerr-Pennington doctrine d[id] not immunize Defendants from RICO
liability”).
228. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted) (The court elaborated that “neither the Noerr-Pennington doctrine nor the First Amendment
more generally protects petitions predicated on fraud or deliberate misrepresentation.”).
229. A. A. MILNE, THE HOUSE AT POOH CORNER 92 (Puffin Books 1992) (1928).

